Political competition
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11891750 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Norman Schofield (0000-0002-1529-7789, Washington University in St. Louis), Michael Laver (0000-0001-7515-9831, Trinity College Dublin) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 1-2 |
| Pages | 179-192 |
| Publication date | 1997-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Political Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0304-4130 • E-ISSN: 1475-6765 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1997.tb00773.x |
| OpenAlex | W4213132543 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 41 |
Many previous theoretical analyses of multiparty coalition behaviour have been based either on one‐dimensional policy model or on a constant‐sum game interpretation. For theoretical and empirical reasons this paper focusses on a competitive two‐dimensional model. In this model parties are concerned with policy outcomes but choose party positions both with a view to electoral consequences and as a basis for coalition bargaining. The political heart is proposed as the set of possible coalition outcomes. The heart is either the core of the political game or is determined by a small number of party positions. Under certain conditions an equilibrium in the choice of party positions can be shown to exist. The model suggests that parties can be categorized as either strong or weak core parties, anti‐core parties or peripheral parties. This categorization of parties implies a typology of party systems, which gives some theoretical foundation for the occurrence of minority, minimal winning and surplus coalitions in many of the European countries in the postwar period
Categorization · Competition (biology · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Interpretation (philosophy · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Typology · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Ideology, Strategy and Party Change
Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
The political consequences of electoral laws
Perspectives on Public Choice
Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments
Coalitions and Collective Action
Existence of a ?structurally stable? equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule
The kernel and payoffs in European government coalitions
Clique analysis of a tolerance relation
Government Coalitions in Western Europe
Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83
Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice
The Uncovered Set and the Core
Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies
Political competitition and multiparty coalition governments
Thresholds of Representation and Thresholds of Exclusion
A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions
Coalitions and Government Formation
Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes
Ethical Decision Rules for Uncertain Voters
Minority Governments in Western Democracies
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections
Government Formation and Endogenous Parties
The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games
Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Party Systems and Government Stability
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,06 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2009 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |