Do birds of a feather deter better? Cultural affinity and alliance deterrence
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 11894923 |
|---|---|
| Autores | S Y Lee (0009-0004-4562-4076, University of Iowa), Saera Lee (0009-0003-8452-6922, University of Iowa), Addison Huygens (0009-0005-6658-1527, University of Iowa), Stephen Mark Mitchell (0000-0003-3804-9259, University of Iowa, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2024 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 138-160 |
| Data de publicação | 2024-12-23 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | International Interactions (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0305-0629 • E-ISSN: 1547-7444 |
| Editora | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/03050629.2024.2441664 |
| OpenAlex | W4405697230 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 41 |
Using a new latent measure of cultural affinity in military alliances (1816–2011), this study shows that states are less likely to be targets of militarized disputes or wars if they are members of defensive alliances with more culturally similar states. The theory posits that alliances between culturally similar states are designed with rules and norms that reflect the community’s shared interests, which helps the members handle intra-alliance conflicts, and strengthens the overall credibility of the agreements, deterring attacks on outside members. Empirical analyses of politically relevant dyads with alliance ties shows that cultural affinity provides deterrence benefits in alliances between democracies (e.g., NATO) or between autocracies (e.g., Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council) and that the deterrence results are strongest for potential targets that are non-democratic
Adversarial system · Alliance · Autocracy · Business · Credibility · Democracy · Deterrence theory · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Cultural Differences and Values · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Perfect Deterrence
The Steps to War
Defense Pacts
Deep engagement and public opinion toward the United States
Allied but Deviating Nato in the Multipolar World
Alliance Politics during the Cold War
Power changes, alliance credibility, and extended deterrence
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944
Alliance Proximity and Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence
Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence
Prior Commitments
Commanding Support
Negotiating Military Alliances
Deterrence theory
Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances
Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? Nato and the ‘New Europe
Exporting Influence
Outside the Wire
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
The International Court of Justice and the World's Three Legal Systems
Do AlliancesReallyDeter
Careful Commitments
War Expansion and War Outcome
Reevaluating Alliance Reliability
Not Only Whether but Whom
Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict
Signaling Foreign Policy Interests
The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence
Birds of a Feather
Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992
Alliance Formation and War
The Deterrent Value of Democratic Allies1
Alliance Reliability in Times of War
International organizations as teachers of norms
Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence
Signaling Alliance Commitments
Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation
Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes
Entrusted norms
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |