Moral hazard at sea

How alliances actually increase low-level maritime provocations between allies

Datos Bibliográficos

ID11894989
AutoresHayoun Jessie Ryou-Ellison (University of Tennessee at Knoxville, autor de correspondencia), Aaron Gold (0000-0003-0841-039X, Sewanee: The University of the South)
Año2019
Volumen46
Número1
Páginas111-132
Fecha de publicación2019-11-12
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaInternational Interactions (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0305-0629 • E-ISSN: 1547-7444
EditorialTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03050629.2020.1688804
OpenAlexW2983162694
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas31

The management of maritime claims is becoming an important issue in the study of interstate conflict. Since World War II, most contested maritime claims have been associated with low-level conflict (mainly shows of force, or what we call maritime provocations) and have not resulted in fatalities. However, what is puzzling is that many competing claims are also associated with states that are alliance partners. To explain this puzzle, we trace the management of maritime claims to states’ participation in different types of security institutions. We argue that joint membership in highly institutionalized security organizations, namely defensive alliances, provides aggrieved challenger states with the opportunity to undermine the position of defending states by using low-level maritime provocations. The alliance has an incentive to provide an institutional security umbrella to maintain its organization’s strength and continuity. High levels of commitment to defensive alliances provide a challenger state with the opportunity to behave provocatively without risking an escalation of the conflict or severely damaging its reputation within the alliance. We test our theory using data on all maritime claims and their associated militarization attempts in the Western Hemisphere and Europe from 1900 to 2001 from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project

Alliance · Business · Economics · Incentive · Maritime Security · Market economy · Militarization · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Reputation · State (computer science · International Maritime Law Issues · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Maritime Security and History