Political competition and foreign policy power sharing

Bibliographic Data

ID11895083
AuthorsKurt Taylor Gaubatz (University of Oxford, corresponding author)
Year2000
Volume26
Issue1
Pages1-19
Publication date2000-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Interactions (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0305-0629 • E-ISSN: 1547-7444
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03050620008434959
OpenAlexW2091680321
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited22

In this essay I examine the intersection of domestic and international politics in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. 1 develop a three‐actor model that allows us to specify the incentives for power sharing under different assumptions about the distribution of preferences and capabilities between a government, a domestic opposition, and a foreign state. The model generates several interesting hypotheses about the interaction of policy goals and the willingness of actors to share power. In particular, I show that under certain conditions there are important asymmetries whereby doves may be more willing to share power than hawks. Importantly, this willingness is endogenous to the model and comes from the alignment of preferences in the policy space, rather than from an a priori value for the democratization of foreign policy making. The model also suggests several hypotheses about the circumstances under which states have incentives to meddle in the foreign policy processes of other states

Competition (biology · Democracy · Democratization · Economic system · Economics · Foreign policy · Foreign policy analysis · Incentive · Microeconomics · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · European Union Policy and Governance · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

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