Designing Alliances

How adversaries provoke peacetime military coordination

Dados Bibliográficos

ID11895666
AutoresJesse C Johnson (0000-0002-8776-4091, University of Kentucky, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume48
Fascículo1
Páginas49-74
Data de publicação2021-12-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoInternational Interactions (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0305-0629 • E-ISSN: 1547-7444
EditoraTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03050629.2021.1973453
OpenAlexW4200329593
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas50

States form military alliances for the security benefits they provide. Despite this common purpose of military alliances, alliances vary a great deal in their design. Notably, some states form alliances that involve extensive peacetime military coordination while others form alliances with minimal peacetime military coordination. I argue that this variation in alliance design is motivated by the bargaining power of any challengers the members face. When a state faces a relatively weak challenger it will not have an incentive to pay the greater cost associated with a high level of peacetime coordination because a low level of peacetime military coordination will deter the challenger. However, if a state faces a relatively strong challenger a low level of peacetime military coordination will fail to deter the challenger and, thus, it will be willing to pay the additional costs associated with a high level of peacetime military coordination. An empirical analysis of the design of alliances from 1816 to 2001 supports hypotheses derived from the argument. The findings highlight how the design of alliances is driven, in part, by the characteristics of nonmembers

Alliance · Argument (complex analysis · Economics · Incentive · Market economy · Peacetime · Political science · State (computer science · Computer Science · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance