Indirect Learning and the Aims-Curricula Fallacy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11952224 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan E Adler (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 223-232 |
| Publication date | 1993-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Philosophy of Education (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0309-8249 • E-ISSN: 1467-9752 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9752.1993.tb00657.x |
| OpenAlex | W2164294465 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
I have two main theses. The first is that the inference from accepting an educational aim, especially an ideal aim such as self-realization or critical thinking, to a conclusion as to the content or structure of a curriculum is fallacious. The first thesis should not be controversial. But even if so, the aims-curricula fallacy is readily committed, and that calls for explanation. My second thesis is that the aims–curricula fallacy is often committed because the possibilities for realizing educational aims through indirect methods or learning is ignored
Critical thinking · Curriculum · Epistemology · Fallacy · Higher education · Ideal (ethics · Inference · Mathematics education · Pedagogy · Philosophy of education · Political science · Realization (probability · Sociology · Education and Critical Thinking Development · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |