In defence of mutuality as an ethical standard in sexual relationships

A Reply to Michael Hand and Michael Reiss

Bibliographic Data

ID11953142
AuthorsSharon Lamb (0000-0001-6196-5541, University of Massachusetts Boston, corresponding author), Samuel C Gable (0000-0003-3933-8036, University of Massachusetts Boston)
Year2022
Volume56
Issue5
Pages695-706
Publication date2022-09-07
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Philosophy of Education (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0309-8249 • E-ISSN: 1467-9752
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9752.12682
OpenAlexW4294877658
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited13

Our 2021 article in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice argued that mutuality, defined as ‘loving attention’ towards a sexual partner, should be a moral standard for ethical sex. We specified that this loving attention should occur in the form of attempting to know what could be knowable about the other person and taking a ‘thick’ view of the other in their particular social and psychological contexts. We contrasted this orientation with the comparatively ‘thin’ view of people from a rights-based ethical perspective that claimed that individuals would have fulfilled their moral duty by acquiring free and informed consent from a partner. Michael Hand and Michael Reiss have responded to the article, and here we respond to their critiques

Duty · Epistemology · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Psychoanalysis · Sexual orientation · Sociology · Law · LGBTQ Health, Identity, and Policy · Marriage and Sexual Relationships · Philosophy · Psychology · Sexuality, Behavior, and Technology · Social Psychology

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