La stratégie des cadres en Russie pour contrer les accusations de crime économique
De Brejnev à Gorbatchev
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11979537 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Luc Duhamel (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 5-21 |
| Publication date | 1991-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0338-0599 • E-ISSN: 2259-6100 |
| Publisher | PERSEE Program (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.3406/receo.1991.1511 |
| OpenAlex | W2071786778 |
| Language | FR |
Executive's strategy in Russia in order to avoid repression by the government : from Brejnev to Gorbachev. In Russia, economic criminality is widespread among the Executives. The Executives have created a system of defence in order to avoid repression by the government. How does this system work when an accusation is brought against the cadre ? Different forms of resistance exist, adapted to circumstances. Effectiveness of resistance differ, finally, due to some factors such as the type of leadership in the Kremlin, social groups and regions
Criminology · Economics · False accusation · Government (linguistics · Order (exchange · Political science · Resistance (ecology · Sociology · Welfare economics · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Historical and Scientific Studies · Law · Russia and Soviet political economy
| Highly cited | No |
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