To Inform and Recommend
Hamilton and the Constitutional Ground for Interaction Between Executive Officers and Congress
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12000654 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Adam M Carrington (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 624-645 |
| Publication date | 2017-06-26 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Presidential Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0360-4918 • E-ISSN: 1741-5705 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/psq.12395 |
| OpenAlex | W2629104597 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
In today's government, executive officers interact continually with Congress on issues of legislation and administration. But does the Constitution's text support such interaction? This article argues that a basis may be found in the State of the Union and the Recommendation clauses of Article II. Combining an examination of the Constitution's text with Alexander Hamilton's at times ambiguous tenure as Treasury secretary, this article argues that such interaction fits within the structure of the two branches. Furthermore, this article distinguishes the two clauses by claiming that executive officers must respond to most requests for information but only recommend at the president's discretion
Administration (probate law · Constitution · Discretion · Government (linguistics · Legislation · Political science · Separation of powers · State (computer science · Treasury · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Law · Law, Rights, and Freedoms · Legal and Constitutional Studies
| Highly cited | No |
|---|