Crisis Management at the Dead Center

The 1960‐1961 Presidential Transition and the Bay of Pigs Fiasco

Bibliographic Data

ID12000720
AuthorsRebecca R Friedman (Council on Foreign Relations, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume41
Issue2
Pages307-333
Publication date2011-03-17
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePresidential Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0360-4918 • E-ISSN: 1741-5705
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1741-5705.2011.03856.x
OpenAlexW1531982001
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited14

Foreign policy decision making during presidential transitions is an inherently difficult challenge. By examining the 1960‐1961 presidential transition and resulting Bay of Pigs fiasco, this article demonstrates that there are six independent, causal variables that best determine the success or failure of foreign policy decision making during presidential transitions: national security decision‐making structure, availability of information relevant to the substance and history of the crisis and its policy responses; focus of time and resources; relevant campaign commitments; “newness” of the incoming administration; and “inheritedness” of the policy. Three of President John F. Kennedy's most important Bay of Pigs decisions are explained using this six‐variable framework. Drawing from the lessons of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, recommendations are offered for how to improve future national security transitions

Administration (probate law · Bay · Biology · Foreign policy · Geography · National security · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Transition (genetics · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Public Administration

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