Presidential Control of Independent Agencies’ Leadership and Personnel
A Two‐Case Study of Interbranch Contestation over the Bureaucracy and the Unitary Executive under Donald Trump
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12001769 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Graham G Dodds (0000-0002-9535-2767, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 168-194 |
| Publication date | 2022-01-18 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Presidential Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0360-4918 • E-ISSN: 1741-5705 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/psq.12773 |
| OpenAlex | W4205409612 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 23 |
This article assesses recent developments in the interbranch struggle over control of the bureaucracy, specifically independent federal agencies and the impact of the unitary executive theory during the presidency of Donald Trump. It examines controversies that involved two Supreme Court cases about independent agencies: Lucia v. SEC (2018), which addressed administrative law judges and the president's appointment power, and Seila Law v. CFPB (2020), which addressed agency leadership and the president's removal power. The two cases have received some attention from legal scholars, but they are not well known among presidency scholars, and they are important for understanding how the unitary executive theory and the interbranch struggle over control of the bureaucracy have developed in recent years
Administrative law · Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Control (management · Economics · Executive power · Law and economics · Management · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Presidency · Presidential system · Separation of powers · Sociology · Supreme court · Unitary state · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Rights, and Freedoms · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration
The Unitary Presidency
The Unitary Executive
Deliberate Discretion?
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?
Presidential Administration
Independent Agencies in the United States
The Law
The Administrative Presidency, Unilateral Power, and the Unitary Executive Theory
The Trump administration and the rule of law
The Unitary Executive Theory
Congress and the Bureaucracy
What Makes an Agency Independent
Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power
Has Barack Obama Embraced the Unitary Executive
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |