Protest militancy in the USSR

When does it work

Bibliographic Data

ID12008669
AuthorsDavid Kowalewski (University of Texas at San Antonio USA, corresponding author)
Year1987
Volume24
Issue2
Pages169-179
Publication date1987-06-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Social Science Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0362-3319 • E-ISSN: 1873-5355
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1016/0362-3319(87)90031-0
OpenAlexW1979588786
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited9

Recent studies of political protest suggest that militant tactics tend to produce greater concessions for aggrieved groups in hegemonies than in polyarchies. In hegemonic systems (such as the Soviet Union), political protest seems to be a two-player, regime-dissident power struggle in which the dissidents' best hope for success lies in overcoming regime force with their own force—disruption and damage. Protest militancy in hegemonies may work even better when militant tactics are combined with other protester power resources and when regime power resources are avoided. A study of 382 demonstrations in the Soviet Union confirms these propositions. Militancy does prove positively correlated with regime concessions under a wide variety of geographic, protest-group, and target characteristics. Yet protest militancy is even more effective under conditions of relative regime weakness and protester strength. The study concludes with some implications for the stability of hegemonic regimes

Physics · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Work (physics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Media Influence and Politics · Political Conflict and Governance

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