The U.S.-PLO Dialogue

The Swedish Connection

Bibliographic Data

ID12021848
AuthorsMohamed Rabie (0000-0002-7915-9756), Mohamed A Rabie (0000-0002-3407-306X, corresponding author)
Year1992
Volume21
Issue4
Pages54-66
Publication date1992-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Palestine Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0377-919X • E-ISSN: 1533-8614
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/2537663
OpenAlexW2018251501
LanguageEN
Citations received3

On 14 December 1988, the United States announced its decision to start a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), reversing a ban that had been in effect since 1975. At that time, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had made a secret commitment to Israel that the U.S. would not negotiate with the PLO unless it recognizes Israel's right to exist and accepts UN Security Council Resolution 242. Later, the conditions were extended to include the renunciation of terrorism. The process that led the U.S. and the PLO to reach an understanding regarding the dialogue was long and taxing. In essence, the dialogue was born of two separate initiatives. The first, specifically aimed at bringing about a U.S.-PLO dialogue, was launched by William Quandt of the Brookings Institution and myself in July 1988. This initiative involved a document outlining what both parties-the U.S. and the PLO-were to say in exchange for accepting the other's conditions for a dialogue. Following discussions to refine the statements, conducted unofficially with the State Department by William Quandt and with Tunis by myself, both parties had accepted in principle the document by September 1988. What had remained for the actual implementation of the initiative was the proper timing

Connection (principal bundle · Geometry · Political science · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · Mathematics · Political Conflict and Governance

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