Procedural (Dis)obedience in Bicameral Bargaining in the United States and the European Union
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12047923 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anne Rasmussen (0000-0002-9517-3929, Leiden University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 267-283 |
| Publication date | 2011-02-10 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of European Integration (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0703-6337 • E-ISSN: 1477-2280 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/07036337.2010.546842 |
| OpenAlex | W2031032910 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 26 |
The EU co‐decision procedure gave the Parliament and the Council the possibility to reconcile differences in a conciliation committee similar to US conference committees. This article examines why important rules regulating the scope of these committees, which at first outset look similar, are applied more flexibly in the US than the EU context. Learning about the conditions under which scope rules are applied flexibly is important for EU scholars because these rules control who affects the final legislative outputs. In accordance with insights from recent institutional literature, the article argues that variation in rule ambiguity, demand for flexible rule interpretation, and bargaining power of the actors interested in modifying the scope rules can help explain these differences in rule application between the two systems. However, it also shows how flexible interpretation of even unambiguous rules may occur
Ambiguity · Conciliation · Context (archaeology · Control (management · Economics · European union · International trade · Interpretation (philosophy · Law and economics · Legislature · Management · Mediation · Obedience · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Scope (computer science · Sociology · Computer Science · EU Law and Policy Analysis · European and International Law Studies · European Union Policy and Governance · Law
Information and Legislative Organization
Institutions and Social Conflict
Bicameralism
Why does the Senate ?win? in conference committee
The Power of the Purse
Maastricht and the Codecision Procedure
Introduction
Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision
Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union
Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion in Rule Interpretation
Who Wins in Conference Committee
Germaneness Rules and Bicameral Relations in the U. S. Congress
A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences
EU conciliation delegates
Behind the scenes
Codecision since Amsterdam
The Politics of Codecision
The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy‐Making Since Maastricht
Understanding the EU Legislative Process
The EU Conciliation Committee
Why are Congressional Committees Powerful
Congress and the Defense Budget
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.15 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2018 (6) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |