La normativité dans la Théorie Pure du Droit peut-elle se prévaloir d'arguments transcendantaux
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12110010 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stanley L Paulson (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 349-370 |
| Publication date | 1987-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Droit et société (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0769-3362 • E-ISSN: 1969-6973 |
| Publisher | LGDJ (PUBLISHER • FR) |
| DOI | 10.3406/dreso.1987.970 |
| OpenAlex | W2334281490 |
| Language | FR |
In the "Pure Theory of Law", Kelsen's normativity thesis may appear to be based on transcendent al arguments. Some critics have concluded that it is. The author demonstrates, by drawing a parallel between Kant's concerna and Kelsen's, that a transcendental argument cannot have the same function in both endeavors and that its role in legal theory can only be a more modest one
Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Function (biology · Humanities · Transcendental number · Chemistry · Law and Political Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |