Dialogical Answerability and Autonomy Ascription

Dados Bibliográficos

ID12147488
AutoresJ Y Lee (0000-0003-1573-7139, University of Copenhagen, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume37
Fascículo1
Páginas97-110
Data de publicação2022-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoHypatia (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0887-5367 • E-ISSN: 1527-2001
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/hyp.2021.81
OpenAlexW4226056572
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas11

Ascribing autonomous status to agents is a valuable practice. As such, we ought to care about how we engage in practices of autonomy ascription. However, disagreement between first-personal experiences of an agent's autonomy and third-personal determinations of their autonomy presents challenges of ethical and epistemic concern. My view is that insights from a dialogical rather than nondialogical account of autonomy give us the resources to combat the challenges associated with autonomy ascription. I draw on Andrea Westlund's account of dialogical autonomy—on which autonomy requires a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external critical perspectives—to make my case

Ascription · Autonomy · Dialogical self · Epistemology · Political science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology