Opening, Polling, Counting
Deterring Election-Day Fraud
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12149497 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marta Regalia (0000-0002-5405-0906, Università del Piemonte Orientale, Italy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 218-238 |
| Publication date | 2023-10-25 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | East European Politics and Societies and Cultures (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0888-3254 • E-ISSN: 1533-8371 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/08883254231203337 |
| OpenAlex | W4388270961 |
| Language | EN |
International election observation has been scrutinized over the past two decades by scholars trying to explain its aim, scope, and consequences. As it is now a standard practice in democratizing countries, scholarly literature has almost reached a consensus on the ability of observers to deter election-day fraud, one of the most positive unintended consequences of election observation. Using data from the 2004 Ukraine presidential election, this article extends our knowledge through a natural experiment on polling station-level election results. I will show that observation during counting does not have a stronger effect than observation during opening and/or polling. Results support previous studies showing the usefulness of election observation in reducing election-day fraud but add an important finding that deserves further scholarly attention
General election · Political science · Politics · Polling · Presidential election · Scope (computer science · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Media Influence and Politics
| Highly cited | No |
|---|