Pyrrhic victories
The cost to the board of ousting the CEO
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12169331 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Ward (0000-0002-8726-1312, Emory University, corresponding author), Karen Bishop (0000-0003-1758-9598), Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey A Sonnenfeld |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 767-781 |
| Publication date | 1999-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Organizational Behavior (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0894-3796 • E-ISSN: 1099-1379 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/(sici)1099-1379(199909)20:5<767::aid-job20>3.0.co;2-p |
| OpenAlex | W2083579551 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 19 |
Going against anecdotal evidence and common perception, the findings presented here show that boards who take action against their CEOs do so only at great cost to themselves, winning only a pyrrhic victory. Indeed, the findings presented show three distinct levels of board turnover. Normal attrition in periods of continuity produced a turnover of 10.99 per cent over two years; routine retirement exists (22.35 per cent) produced a similar turnover level to forced exits which did not imply a failure of the board to perform its monitoring function (25.36 per cent). However, forced CEO exits which implied a failure in the board's monitoring and advising roles caused a dramatically higher level of subsequent board turnover (40.55 per cent). These findings demonstrate that is not only the CEO that is forced to sacrifice his or her job when a company is in distress, but that the board is also accountable for its failure to perform its monitoring and advising duties adequately. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
Attrition · Business · Demographic economics · Economics · Labour economics · Sacrifice · Corporate Finance and Governance · Corporate Insolvency and Governance · Medicine · Risk Management in Financial Firms · Accounting · History
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,04 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2001 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |