Slavery and Just Compensation in American Constitutionalism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID12176176
AutoresStephan Stohler (0000-0002-9832-274X, North Central College, autor correspondente)
Ano2018
Volume44
Fascículo1
Páginas102-135
Data de publicação2018-01-26
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoLaw & Social Inquiry (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0897-6546 • E-ISSN: 1747-4469
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/lsi.12351
OpenAlexW2793338509
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas55

The existence of compensation clauses, guaranteeing compensation when governments took private property, in antebellum state constitutions varied considerably across states and over time. Existing explanations struggle to account for such variation. I argue that slavery had an important, though varied, influence, depending on the changing strategic behavior of proslavery constitutional drafters. Proslavery delegates opposed compensation when they expected to control political decision making, but supported compensation when uncertain. This argument identifies another way that slavery impacted US constitutional development, and further suggests that American rights development resembles the experiences of other countries where elite interests were threatened

Action (physics · Compensation (psychology · Computer security · Constitutionalism · Content (measure theory · Democracy · Law and economics · Physics · Political science · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology