Explaining Durable Business Coalitions in U.S. Politics
Conservatives and Corporate Interests across America's Statehouses
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12179142 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alexander Hertel-Fernandez (0000-0002-7978-0550), Alexander Hertel‐fernandez (Harvard University Press, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-18 |
| Publication date | 2016-03-22 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Studies in American Political Development (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0898-588X • E-ISSN: 1469-8692 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0898588x15000152 |
| OpenAlex | W2329396287 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 14 |
Scholars of business mobilization emphasize that national, cross-sector employer associations are difficult to create and maintain in decentralized pluralist polities like the United States. This article considers an unusual case of a U.S. business group—the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)—that has succeeded in creating a durable coalition of diverse firms and conservative political activists. This group has emerged since the 1970s as an important infrastructure for facilitating corporate involvement in the policymaking process across states. Assessing variation within this group over time through both its successes and missteps, I show the importance of organizational strategies for cementing political coalitions between otherwise fractious political activists and corporate executives from diverse industries. A shadow comparison between ALEC and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce further serves to reinforce the importance of organizational structure for business association management. My findings engage with literatures in both American business history and comparative political economy, underscoring the difficulties of forming business coalitions in liberal political economies while also showing how savvy political entrepreneurs can still successfully unite otherwise fragmented corporate interests. These conclusions, in turn, have implications for our understanding of business mobilization and corporate influence in politics
Business sector · Corporate governance · Corporate group · Economics · Legislature · Management · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Politics of the United States · Public relations · Shadow (psychology · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
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| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |