Trump power
Maximum pressure and China’s sanctions enforcement against North Korea
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12207253 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Inhan Kim (0000-0002-1426-108X, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, CO, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 96-124 |
| Publication date | 2019-04-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Pacific Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-2748 • E-ISSN: 1470-1332 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09512748.2018.1549589 |
| OpenAlex | W2930978243 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 23 |
China has started choking off the flow of financial resources entering North Korea by blocking North Korea’s export of natural resources and other industrial products since early 2017. What has pushed Beijing to enforce sanctions strictly, in contrast with its loose administration of sanctions in the past? By employing principal-agent theory, this article shows that Beijing’s conformity to sanctions depends on China’s own need and the degree of pressure from Washington for sanctions enforcement. Until the end of the Obama administration, China did not act meaningfully for sanctions enforcement, as the pressure from Washington was weak and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities remained limited. Now, international contexts have dramatically changed. Beijing feels a need to discipline Pyongyang with sanctions as Pyongyang has become a de facto nuclear weapon state. The new Trump administration in Washington has also pushed Beijing to do more to rein in Pyongyang’s weapon programs
Administration (probate law · Beijing · Business · China · Deterrence theory · Enforcement · International trade · Political science · Sanctions · State (computer science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies · Law
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Why can’t the drama stop? US–China rivalry and security triangulation on the Korean peninsula
Hard Target
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
China's Sanctions on North Korea After Its Fourth Nuclear Test
Why C hina's Leaders Benefit from a Nuclear, Threatening N orth K orea
China’s Evolving Policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under Xi Jinping
The enforcement problem in Resolution 2094 and the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime
China's engagement-oriented strategy towards North Korea
Pulling the Plug
Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers
Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint
Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy
Soft Balancing against the United States
Keeping the Bombs in the Basement
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North Korea in 2013
Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community
Delegation to International Organizations
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
The New Economics of Organization
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,83 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |