On Three Alleged Theories of Rational Behavior

Bibliographic Data

ID12227943
AuthorsStuart Rachels (corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume21
Issue4
Pages506-520
Publication date2009-11-12
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueUtilitas (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0953820809990252
OpenAlexW2163720581
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited26

What behavior is rational? It's rational to act ethically, some think. Others endorse instrumentalism – it is rational to pursue one's goals. Still others say that acting rationally always involves promoting one's self-interest. Many philosophers have given each of these answers. But these answers don't really conflict; they aren't vying to describe some shared concept or to solve some mutually acknowledged problem. In so far as this is debated, it is a pseudo-debate. The different uses of ‘rational action’ differ merely in meaning. I shall defend the following claims: ‘rational behavior’ is used in ethical, prudential, and instrumental ways (section I); these uses of ‘rational behavior’ are distinct (section II); they do not represent competing theories of rational behavior (section III); we should stop using ‘rational behavior’ ethically and prudentially, but we may continue its instrumental use (section IV)

Action (physics · Economics · Epistemology · Instrumentalism · Law and economics · Meaning (existential · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Positive economics · Rational agent · Rational choice theory (criminology · Rational expectations · Rationality · Section (typography · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science

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