A Conflict in Common-Sense Moral Psychology
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12227971 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aaron Z Zimmerman (0000-0003-2247-8091, University of California, Santa Barbara, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 401-423 |
| Publication date | 2009-11-12 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Utilitas (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0953820809990197 |
| OpenAlex | W1982403929 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
Ordinary thinking about morality and rationality is inconsistent. To arrive at a view of morality that is as faithful to common thought as consistency will allow we must admit that it is not always irrational to knowingly act against the weight of reasons
Common sense · Consistency (knowledge bases · Epistemology · Irrational number · Morality · Rationality · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|