Moral Significance and Overpermissiveness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12228136 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fırat Akova (0000-0002-4776-2577, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 119-130 |
| Publication date | 2023-01-16 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Utilitas (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0953820822000462 |
| OpenAlex | W4316466514 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 7 |
As opposed to overdemanding principles which ask individuals to sacrifice too much, there are overpermissive principles which ask individuals to sacrifice too little. Determining the extent to which one should sacrifice often comes with the need of understanding what is of moral significance. By analysing different readings of moral significance, and singling out one specific interpretation of moral significance which links moral significance to gaining or losing a considerable amount of welfare, I demonstrate that one of the well-known principles of Peter Singer, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, is overpermissive as it exempts deliberately cultivated morally significant lavish pursuits from the domain of sacrifice. Overpermissiveness not only renders moral principles unreasonably broad but also causes burdens to be distributed unjustifiably in a comparative sense, where some parties are assigned a moral obligation whereas others are not
Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Moral obligation · Obligation · Political science · Sacrifice · Theology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |