Alienation, Deprivation, and the Well-being of Persons
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12228802 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Benjamin Yelle (University of Miami, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 367-384 |
| Publication date | 2014-08-04 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Utilitas (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s095382081400017x |
| OpenAlex | W2096576123 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 16 |
While many theories of well-being are able to capture some of our central intuitions about well-being, e.g. avoiding alienation worries, they typically do so at the cost of not being able to capture others, e.g. explaining deprivation. However, both of these intuitions are important and any comprehensive theory of well-being ought to attempt to strike the best balance in responding to both concerns. In light of this, I develop and defend a theory of well-being which holds that our well-being depends, in part, on the nature of our well-being qua person, a class whose members are defined by their possessing certain cognitive and volitional capacities including those capacities constitutive of autonomy. I argue that this ‘person-centred’ theory of well-being is able to address concerns about alienation and deprivation, along with capturing the importance of autonomy to well-being, better than many popular subjective and objective theories of well-being
Alienation · Autonomy · Balance (ability · Cognition · Epistemology · Political science · Psychotherapist · Relative deprivation · Sociology · Well-being · Law · Optimism, Hope, and Well-being · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychological Well-being and Life Satisfaction · Psychology · Social Psychology
Welfare Invariabilism
Why Subjectivists About Welfare Needn't Idealize
Against Welfare Subjectivism
An Individual-Based Hybrid Well-Being Theory
Distinguishing Disadvantage from Ill-Being in the Capability Approach
Human and Animal Well‐Being
Felt-Quality Hedonism, Alienation, and the Spirit of Resonance
Once more, without feeling
Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires
Are Measures of Well-Being Philosophically Adequate
Well-being, part 2
A theory of the good and the right
Facts and Values
Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good
Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics
Identification and externality
Well-Being and the Priority of Values
Well-Being and Virtue
Reasons and Persons
Moral Realism
Structures of Agency
Internalism and the Good for a Person
A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being
Self-Constitution
Morality and Virtue
| Citations per year | 1.22 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |