Aumann's and Schelling's Game Theory
The Nobel Prize in Economic Science, 2005
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12229017 |
|---|---|
| Authors | S Abu Turab Rizvi (University of Vermont, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 297-316 |
| Publication date | 2007-07-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0953-8259 • E-ISSN: 1465-3982 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09538250701452990 |
| OpenAlex | W2061643891 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 54 |
Robert Aumann and Thomas Schelling won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 2005. Their work in game theory shows two different approaches to understanding strategic interaction. Schelling's work on the strategic aspects of negotiations, focal points, and self-command is mathematically informal and is based on experimental and inductive knowledge of players' capabilities. Aumann's work on repeated games and common knowledge is mathematically deductive, and assumes highly rational agents. An exploration of their work allows for a comparison of these two approaches
Classical economics · Economic science · Economics · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Neoclassical economics · Physics · Social science · Sociology · Strategic interaction · Work (physics · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
Micromotives and macrobehavior
Convention
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Markets with a Continuum of Traders
Games with randomly disturbed payoffs
Information, trade and common knowledge
Agreeing to Disagree
Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
Two-Person Cooperative Games
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
The Bargaining Problem
Sequential Equilibria
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
Games and Decisions
Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games
Preference Formation and the Axioms of Choice
Game Theory to the Rescue
Who Will Have the Bomb
Abolition of Ballistic Missiles
Dynamic models of segregation
Strategy and Arms Control
The Economics of Missing Markets
Convention
American Foreign Assistance
Arms Control
Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games
Distinguished Fellow
What Went Wrong with Arms Control
| Highly cited | No |
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