Naw Bahar District 2010–11
A case study of counterinsurgency Conducted by Naval Special Warfare in Afghanistan
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12258060 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas H Briggs (0009-0008-4910-5467, University of Central Florida, corresponding author), Thomas Briggs |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 122-136 |
| Publication date | 2014-01-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Small Wars and Insurgencies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0959-2318 • E-ISSN: 1743-9558 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09592318.2014.893970 |
| OpenAlex | W1982288175 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 2 |
This article provides a critical analysis of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan at the tactical level. The efforts of several Naval Special Warfare detachments deployed to Naw Bahar district in Zabul Province, Afghanistan are examined in detail to identify key successes and failures in planning and execution. It defines the operating environment in which the detachments worked and identifies the goals and outcomes of the first and second phases of the counterinsurgency effort. The article concludes by placing the tactical effort in the context of the overall strategy in Afghanistan and suggests that time is the limiting factor to success. © 2014 Taylor & Francis
Criminology · Political science · Sociology · Cultural, Psychoanalytic, and Sociopolitical Reflections · Education, Leadership, and Health Research · Global Socioeconomic and Political Dynamics
| Citations per year | 0.13 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2018 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |