On the Problem of Affective Nihilism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12314886 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kaitlyn Creasy (0000-0003-1125-1465, Butler University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 31-51 |
| Publication date | 2018-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Nietzsche Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0968-8005 • E-ISSN: 1538-4594 |
| Publisher | The Pennsylvania State University Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.5325/jnietstud.49.1.0031 |
| OpenAlex | W3144633250 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
Bernard Reginster has argued that Nietzschean nihilism is best characterized as a “philosophical claim.” This account has inspired a number of critical responses. While Reginster's characterization presents nihilism as a purely cognitive phenomenon, involving particular beliefs about meaning and value, it is just as frequently presented by Nietzsche as a feeling-based phenomenon, a weariness with one's world that comports one negatively toward the world. How, then, should Nietzsche's reader understand the problem of nihilism in his thought? In this article, I examine Nietzsche's account of drives, affects, and the relations he establishes between them to show that nihilism must be understood not only as involving particular beliefs, but as a psychophysiological condition, which I call, following Ken Gemes and John Richardson, affective nihilism
Epistemology · Feeling · Meaning (existential · Nihilism · Phenomenon · Psychoanalysis · Value (mathematics · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2024 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |