Julius Bahnsen's Influence on Nietzsche's Wills-Theory

This article traces the development of Nietzsche's early adoption and later rejection of Schopenhauer's theory of Will. I argue that Nietzsche's break with Schopenhauer was coextensive with his acceptance of explanatory naturalism about both external and internal activities. I argue further that a major source for four of his specific arguments against the Schopenhauerian primacy of the one Will was the little-known neo-Schopenhauerian thinker Julius Bahnsen. Using Bahnsen, Nietzsche argues (1) that there is no empirical evidence of a transcendent Will; (2) that explanations of behavior do not require a transcendent Will; (3) that what explains behavior is not a “thing” at all, but a fluid dynamic of strivings; and (4) that these strivings are “guided” even absent a distinct guiding principle

Epistemology · Naturalism · German Literature and Culture Studies · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy

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  Holger Schmid, The Nietzsche Society•New Nietzsche Studies•2002

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• Wie ich wurde was ich ward

  E Ritchie, Julius Bahnsen et al.•The Philosophical Review•1906

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  Harry Slochower•The Philosophical Review•1932

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