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What life after default? Time horizons and the outcome of the Argentine debt restructuring deal

Bibliographic Data

ID12316675
AuthorsGiselle Datz (0000-0002-4585-7759, Virginia Tech, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume16
Issue3
Pages456-484
Publication date2009-09-10
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueReview of International Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0969-2290 • E-ISSN: 1466-4526
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09692290802454653
OpenAlexW2043956124
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited24

Although a recurrent phenomenon, sovereign debt restructurings following defaults on debt obligations do not engender today the exact same dynamics they did in the past. On the one hand, prevalent reputational models have overestimated the costs of default in terms of access to new credit. On the other hand, debtors' restructuring strategies have been underestimated in the face of anticipated constraints on developing countries' policy autonomy believed to flow from financial globalization. By focusing on the latest Argentine debt restructuring (the largest and most complex in history to date), I find that the outcome of sovereign debt restructurings in terms of credit (re)access are much less contingent on market punishments based on reputations than on the short-term nature of financial incentives in the bond industry as well as on international lending cycles. Time horizons play a crucial role in how debtors take advantage of different creditors' incentives to participate in a restructuring. A critical implication is that governments have more room to maneuver in taking contentious policy stances (such as stringent debt restructuring deals) than the literature on economic globalization accounts for. Also, far from a zero-sum game, for both debtors and some of their creditors, debt restructurings can prove to be attractive deals for their specific purposes

Creditor · Debt · Debt restructuring · Default · Economics · External debt · Financial system · Incentive · Market economy · Monetary economics · Restructuring · Sovereign debt · Sovereign default · Sovereignty · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Global Financial Crisis and Policies · Finance

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Unique citing works8
Citations per year0,47
Citation span2009 - 2022 (14)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 8

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