In Defence of the Secular? Islamisation, Christians and (New) Politics in Urbane Malaysia
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12349506 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yeoh Seng Guan, Seng‐guan Yeoh (0000-0002-2072-7392, Monash University Malaysia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 83-103 |
| Publication date | 2011-02-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Asian Studies Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1035-7823 • E-ISSN: 1467-8403 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10357823.2011.552101 |
| OpenAlex | W2075022919 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 27 |
Besides the clarion call for a “new politics” by opposition political parties, a significant catalyst that arguably swayed Christian electoral choices in the landmark Malaysian general elections of March 2008 was the counsel by religious leaders to safeguard “the secular state”. This action was prompted by recent high profile controversial legal cases that were perceived to be a serious erosion of the freedom of religion clause guaranteed in the secularist Federal Constitution. In this essay, I not only examine the recent antecedents of this course of action but also delve into the more distant past in order to draw out how the apparently impervious categories of “religion” and “the secular” have been implicated in the structuring of social and political imaginaries in Malaysia. Keywords: MalaysiaChristiansIslamisationsecular statefreedom of religion Acknowledgments An early version of this article was first presented at the ‘Islam and Secularism in Malaysia’ workshop held at the Centre for Arabic and Islamic Studies at The Australian National University in December 2008. I wish to thank Dr Gaik-Cheng Khoo for her kind invitation and the workshop participants for fostering a convivial atmosphere. I also thank the journal's referees for their valuable comments, but the usual disclaimer applies. Notes 1. A primary motivation offered for this stance is the fear of punitive actions and persecutions against religious and ethnic minorities. While large-scale events of this nature in Malaysia are historically weak, the outbursts of localised violence against ethnic and religious minorities in the neighbouring Muslim-majority country of Indonesia provided instructive examples. Rather than taking an overt confrontational tone (for instance, in the media), the mainstream church leadership has generally counselled for face-to-face meetings with high-ranking government officials to address a host of issues, such as the difficulty of getting visas for missionaries, the lack of land allocated for churches and cemeteries, the banning of Christian publications written in Malay and Indonesian, and so forth. 2. Arguably, Indian Hindus were more singularly forthright in their political choices, given the widespread negative public perception of how the government handled the Hindraf (Hindu Rights Action Front) public demonstrations in November 2007, which were organised to dramatise Indian marginalisation in the country. For a wider analysis of the electoral significance of the 8 March elections, see Ooi Kee Beng, Johan Savaranamuttu and Lee Hock Guan (Citation2008). 3. While my essay has wider relevance to discussions on “the secular” where Muslims are the majority citizens of the modern nation-state, space prevents me from engaging more directly with current “post-secularisation” theoretical debates as documented in the American Social Science Research Council Immanent Frame blog. See http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/category/secularism/, accessed 10 August 2010. 4. Talal Asad reminds us that the terms “secularism” and “secularist” were reintroduced to the English language by free thinkers in the middle of the nineteenth century in order to avoid the charge of their being “atheists” and “infidels”, terms that carried suggestions of immorality in a largely Christian society (Asad, Citation2003, p. 23). 5. For a study of responses by non-Muslim religious minorities, particularly Christians, in the face of government-driven Islamisation up to the turn of the millennium, refer to Peter Riddell (Citation2005). 6. Formed in 1986, the Christian Federation of Malaysia is a coalition of three major groupings of different Christian traditions and persuasions – namely, the Roman Catholic Church, Council of Churches of Malaysia, and National Evangelical Christian Fellowship. 7. The idea of an inter-faith council was first mooted in 1983 by leaders of non-Muslim religions in response to statements by authorities regarding intentions to convert Malaysia into an Islamic state. The organisation was officially registered as a society in the same year with the expressed aims of promoting understanding, mutual respect and cooperation between people of different religions, studying and resolving problems affecting all inter-religious relationships, and making representations regarding religious matters when necessary. Representing the Christian constituency in the council is the Christian Federation of Malaysia. 8. Press Statement, Christian Federation of Malaysia, dated 27 February 2001. 9. Press Statement, Catholic Bishops' Conference of Malaysia on the Declaration of Freedom of Religion in Malaysia, dated 1 August 2002. 10. Press Statement, Catholic Bishops' Conference of Malaysia on the Declaration of Freedom of Religion in Malaysia, dated 1 August 2002. 11. The Taoists were not yet part of the group. 12. Press Statement, MCCBCHS on Declaration of Freedom of Religion, dated 31 January 2002. 13. Press Statement, Christian Federation of Malaysia, dated 7 July 2002. 14. Press Statement, Christian Federation of Malaysia, dated 18 July 2002. 15. See, for instance, the press statement by CFM entitled ‘The right of non-Muslims to use the word “Allah” to speak of God’, dated 5 January 2008. In the same year, a customs officer stationed at the airport confiscated 32 English Bibles brought in by a passenger for use in her own church. The officer claimed that Bibles needed to be cleared by the Internal Security Ministry's Control Division of Publications and Al-Quran Texts. See Press Statement by CFM entitled ‘Hands off our Bibles’, dated 5 February 2008. 16. The Star, 19 July 2002; The New Straits Times, 19 July 2002. 17. For instance, see Press Statement, CFM National Day Message, dated 30 August 2006. 18. Press Statement, CFM National Day Message – 50th anniversary of Merdeka, dated 29 August 2007. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. See ‘Malaysia not a secular state, says Najib’, Bernama, 17 July 2007 in http:///www.bernama.com.my/bernama/v3/news.php?id=273699, accessed 20 September 2008. Following initial questioning of Najib's statement by members of the opposition party, a gag order was placed on public discussion of the matter except for statements issued by the prime minister and deputy prime minister. 22. Press Statement, CFM, dated 19 July 2007. 23. See Suaram Malaysia Human Rights Report 2006, p. 90f. 24. See Tan and Lee (Citation2008). Refer to J. Lee (Citation2010, pp. 62-73) for contending legal arguments presented at the trial. 25. See Note of Protest, p. 2. 26. For a discussion of the Hindraf's street demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur, see Yeoh (Citation2009). 27. An historical precedent for the Roman Catholic Church's public stance in addressing state injustice was the aftermath of “Operasi Lalang” in 1987, which included several Christians among the 107 individuals arrested for anti-security reasons. See Riddell (Citation2005). 28. Many of the well-known Christian bloggers were also associated with a collective blog, http://www.themicahmandate.org/. 29. For instance, refer to http://www.malaysia-today.net/2008/; http://www.jeffooi.com/; http://harismibrahim.wordpress.com/; http://malikimtiaz.blogspot.com/; http://elizabethwong.wordpress.com/; and http://tonypua.blogspot.com/. 30. For details, see Yeoh (Citation1997, p. 41). 31. See Yeoh (Citation1997, p. 43f). 32. Malayan Review, February 1949, p. 157. See also Yeoh (Citation1997, pp. 50ff). 33. For more details, refer to Yeoh (Citation1997, pp. 52ff). 34. The Rukun Negara resonates with the Pancasila of Indonesia as a model for secular citizenship. Although the latter was first formulated during independence (the Jakarta Charter of 1945), it was reconstituted by President Sukarno in the 1960s. He elevated “belief in God” from its original fifth ranking to the top of state ideology to signify that all citizens would be obliged to believe in God in line with a vision to make Indonesia a “religious state” rather than a theocratic state (Islam) (Owen, Citation2005, p. 433f). Moreover, in addressing the pressure of Islamic groups, he modified “belief in God” to “belief in one supreme God” in order to give it a monotheistic slant (An-Na'im, Citation2008, p. 259). 35. Italian theorist Giorgo Agamben (Citation1998) has examined the European tradition of governmentality in terms of the indissociability of the ideals of sacrality and sovereignty. These ideas underwent cultural translation in the periphery of the European colonies. For British Malaya, A.C. Milner (Citation2002) has argued for the contesting, changing and mutually constituting discourses of three main types of social ideals put forth by their ideological proponents during the colonial era – namely, kerajaan (monarchy), umat (Muslim community) and bangsa (“nation” or “ethnic group”). In the postcolonial era, these disparate trajectories continue to animate political discourse and social imaginaries. 36. Indeed, this was a major structural weakness identified by a key scholar in the Islamic reform process, Professor Ahmad Ibrahim. He noted that “in contrast to the civil courts, the Syariah courts were for a long time neglected and forgotten. There were no independent judicial and legal services for them and the judges and officers belonging to the general administrative service were subject to the control of the Religious Councils and the religious departments. The judges of the Syariah High Courts did not have the independent status, remuneration and terms of service of the civil judges. The facilities provided for the Syariah were far below those provided for the civil courts” (cited in Hamayotsu, Citation2003, p. 60). 37. For recent examples of this genre in Malaysia, refer to Walters (Citation2002) and the writings of the Sabahan Jesuit priest, Father Jojo Fung, found at http://pweb.sophia.ac.jp/jesuit45/JojoFung.html, accessed 15 September 2008. For a wider Asian perspective, see Amaladoss (Citation2006) and Pieris (Citation1988)
Political science · Politics · Secular variation · Sociology · Asian Studies and History · Demography · Law · Religion and Society Interactions · Religion, Society, and Development
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| Unique citing works | 8 |
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| Citations per year | 0,62 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |