How do public agencies respond to budgetary control? A theory of strategic task portfolios in public administration

Bibliographic Data

ID12397691
AuthorsJonghoon Lee (0000-0002-7059-3126, National Tsing Hua University, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume36
Issue2
Pages281-298
Publication date2026-01-12
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1053-1858 • E-ISSN: 1477-9803
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/jopart/muag001
OpenAlexW7124159930
LanguageEN
References cited54

How do public agencies manage diverse programs under limited budgets? Resource constraints force agencies to prioritize tasks, requiring strategic decisions about how to allocate resources effectively. In this article, I develop a game-theoretical model that explores how agencies shape and restructure their task portfolios under budgetary constraints. In response to budget reductions, I argue that agencies reallocate resources by prioritizing more efficient tasks for improved performance within their portfolios. To test my theoretical claims, I analyze an original dataset of antitrust cases filed by the US Antitrust Division (AD) from 1970 to 2019. Using compositional analysis, I find systematic associations between budgetary changes and the AD’s litigation portfolios. Specifically, budget cuts are associated with a higher share of antitrust criminal cases—the most efficient type for improving performance metrics—and with relatively lower shares for other case types. This study offers new insight into how public agencies navigate budgetary constraints to achieve their public missions while meeting performance expectations

Administration (probate law · Resource (disambiguation · Resource allocation · Restructuring · Strategic planning · Task (project management · Test (biology · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Policy and Administration Research

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