Stealing Al Qaeda's Playbook

Bibliographic Data

ID12407113
AuthorsJarret M Brachman, Jarret Brachman (United States Military Academy, corresponding author), William McCants (United States Military Academy), William F McCants
Year2006
Volume29
Issue4
Pages309-321
Publication date2006-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueStudies in Conflict and Terrorism (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1057-610X • E-ISSN: 1521-0731
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10576100600634605
OpenAlexW2024326749
LanguageEN
Citations received9

The key to defeating the jihadi movement is identifying its strengths and weaknesses so that the former may be countered or co-opted and the latter exploited. This article argues that the people who know these strengths and weaknesses best are the jihadis themselves; one just needs to know where (and how) to look for their insights. To this end, this article demonstrates a method for mining the works of jihadi ideologues for tactical and strategic information that will help the United States craft effective measures for defeating the jihadi movement and its followers. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government. Notes With the exception of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, the other books discussed herein can be found in Arabic on Al Qaeda's premier electronic library, http://www.tawhed.ws.Zawahiri's work is readily available online in English translation. Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Barbarism, p. 7. William McCants translated this work for the Olin Institute at Harvard (which plans to make it available this summer) under the direction of Michael Doran, who was one of the first people to find the text on the Internet. Doran has written a very insightful introduction to the work that is not yet published (the observation regarding the spread of jihadi strategy documents online as a consequence of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan is his). Stephen Ulph at http://www.jamestown.org has also written a useful précis of the work. Naji, Management, pp. 24, 28, 39, 98. Ibid., pp. 23–24. Ibid., pp. 28–30. Ibid., p. 39. Ibid., p. 48. Ibid., p. 37–40. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 5. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 7–8. Ibid., pp. 8, 10, 19. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 91. Ibid., p. 61. Ibid., p. 12 and passim. Ibid., p. 19. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., pp. 16–21. Ibid., pp. 25–27, 65–67, 71–72. Ibid., pp. 16–17. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., p. 17, 25. Ibid., pp. 31–33. Ibid., pp. 106–109. Ibid., pp. 19, 41. Ibid., p. 82. Salafis are Sunni Muslims who believe that the true understanding of Islam is based solely on the words and deeds of Muhammad and his Companions; therefore, they are extremely conservative given that their understanding of Islam is rooted in the seventh century. But they are not traditional religious thinkers because they refuse to accept the rulings of most medieval Muslim authorities, unless they are also based on the practice of the pious forefathers (salaf.) Ibid., pp. 73–80. Ibid., pp. 46–47. Ibid., p. 75. Sufis are Muslim mystics (predominantly Sunni) who seek to draw closer to God. Sufi ideas began to percolate in early Islam, but followers of Sufi leaders did not begin to organize themselves into brotherhoods until a later period. Their fraternal bonds and their obedience to a local spiritual guide make Sufi orders a very powerful and cohesive element of Islamic society. Aside from the shared focus on drawing closer to God, Sufis are incredibly diverse. Some Sufi orders are entirely otherworldly, eschewing politics altogether, while others are more activist (e.g. members of some Sufi orders in Afghanistan fought against the Soviets). Some are extremely conservative, while others are more liberal in their religious practice. Ibid., p. 69. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 34. Abu Qatada, Between Two Methods, Article 8. Abu Qatada is a Jordanian of Palestinian origin. He studied Islamic law in Saudi Arabia, where he obtained a Master's degree in jurisprudence. In 1993 he went to the United Kingdom seeking political asylum. There he edited al-Ansar, the official organ of the GIA (the Armed Islamic Group, a particularly violent jihadi organization in Algeria that was responsible for massacring thousands of civilians during the 1990s), and served as Al Qaeda's chief spokesman and coordinator in Europe. Although the U.K. government has curtailed his activities, his writings continue to have an immense influence on the jihadi movement. Abu Qatada, Between Two Methods, Article 8. Ibid., Article 8 and 9. For example, in 2002, 400 followers gathered in a French mosque to hear a badly-relayed phone call from Madkhali to the congregation (http://www.fsa.ulaval.ca/personnel/vernag/EH/F/cause/lectures/essor_des_salafistes.htm). See also Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, 251–253. ICG Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: "Who Are the Islamists?" 31 September 2004, p. 6. Ibid. Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, Observations, Concerning the Jihadi Experience in Syria, pp. 6–7. "A Statement by Abu Mus'ab al-Suri in Response to the Announcement by the U.S. State Department," Majallat risalat al-mujahidin (2005) (no. 3), pp. 10 (available online at http://www.eprism.org). For example, Reuvan Paz has noted that Abu Muhammad al-Hilali's recent analysis of jihadi terrorist attacks in Egypt is heavily indebted to Suri for its overall theoretical framework (Reuven Paz, "Al Qaeda's Search for New Fronts: Instructions for Jihadi Activity in Egypt and Sinai," PRISM Occasional Papers 3(7) (October 2005), available online at http://www.e-prism.org). Suri, Global Resistance, p. 666. Suri, Observations, pp. 7–8. Ibid., p. 8. Suri, "Statement," p. 9. Suri, Observations, pp. 9–10. Suri, Global Resistance, p. 731. Suri, Observations, p. 6. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 2. Suri, Global Resistance, p. 1445. Suri, Observations, p. 4. Ibid., p. 9. Suri, Global Resistance, p. 1335f. Ibid., pp. 192–193, 881. Note that these recommendations are aimed solely at destroying the jihadi movement and must be balanced with other U.S. strategic goals. For the use of the oil-spot strategy in Iraq, see Andrew F. Krepinevich's "How to Win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs (September/October 2005). It is questionable whether the Department of Defense can or should manage or be involved in such programs, especially sensitive, classified efforts. The following statement from Karen Hughes, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, was cited recently on a jihadi website as proof that the U.S.'s new diplomatic efforts in the region are sinister and meant to pave the way for further military occupation: "And we plan to forward-deploy regional SWAT teams who can look at the big picture and formulate a more strategic and focused approach to all our public diplomacy assets; not just country by country, but within a region of the world ..." (Loy Henderson Auditorium, Washington, DC, 8 September 2005). The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is currently conducting this type of investigation using recently declassified Al Qaeda documents, which are being made publicly available for the first time at http://www.ctc.usma.edu

Al qaeda · Computer security · Political science · Terrorism · Computer Science · Engineering · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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