Government Mass Killing and Post-Conflict Domestic Trials
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12408347 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nam Kyu Kim (0000-0003-0621-4192, Political Science and Diplomacy, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, South Korea, corresponding author), Gary Uzonyi (0000-0001-6006-993X, Political Science, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, USA) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 396-413 |
| Publication date | 2018-04-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1057-610X • E-ISSN: 1521-0731 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/1057610x.2018.1469587 |
| OpenAlex | W2801375490 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
Why do some countries implement trials to punish perpetrators of state-sponsored mass killing during civil war? A common explanation is that domestic and international demand for justice pressures the government to implement trials. However, this demand is unlikely to produce prosecutions because state-sponsored violence during fighting provides elites incentive to conceal information after war. The revelation of information concerning the government's atrocities could result in renewed domestic instability or international sanction. Therefore, a government that has committed atrocities during the civil war, and emerges victorious from the conflict, should be unlikely to pursue trials in the aftermath of the war
Criminology · Economic Justice · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · International law · Political science · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · State (computer science · War crime · International Law and Human Rights · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,4 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |