The Turkish Military as a Political Actor

During the summer of 2013, as hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets to criticize Mohammed Morsi's Freedom and Justice Party for its increasingly autocratic and “Islamic” posture, the Egyptian military under General Sisi toppled the government and suspended the constitution. By contrast, what did not happen in Turkey when hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets in June 2013 to criticize then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (JDP) attracted little attention. The military, the pivotal actor in Turkish politics since 1960, with four coups under its belt, was not there. What would have happened if the so-called Gezi Park protests of summer 2013 had broken out in 2007, when the army was still considered a potent political force? Suggesting that Turkey in 2007 would have looked like Egypt in 2013 would be a stretch; Turkey is not Egypt. Yet, it is difficult to make the case that everything would have been the same. The question then becomes, what happened to the military? Between 2007 and 2011, the presence in politics of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) was literally shattered. This came as a result of a series of high-profile trials (some of which are now widely accepted to have been based on fabricated evidence) as well as public-relations (or, according to some, defamation) campaigns that ironically resembled the armed forces’ modus operandi during its last — “post-modern” — coup in 1997. Put simply, the process through which the army quit the political sphere was neither voluntary nor graceful. It was, in the end, a countercoup of sorts. The puzzle, then, runs even deeper: how could the JDP defeat the military in a game — rough power politics — in which the latter had excelled since the coup of 1960? In this article, we provide a novel and counterintuitive explanation for this puzzle: as its political might grew, the army's mode of involvement in politics became too sophisticated and over-bureaucratized for its own good, eventually rendering it too “slow” a political actor to keep up with the JDP's “agile” and pragmatic modus operandi. As tensions between the army and the JDP were boiling by 2007–11, the latter was able to catch the former off-guard and effectively pacify it by putting its weight behind legal cases such as Ergenekon and Balyoz. These involved numerous members of the military being charged with crimes ranging from conspiracy against the elected government to outright terrorism. At the same time, the JDP galvanized public support behind then Prime Minister Erdoğan, who himself had been a victim of the military's overbearing political might in the past, outflanking the TAF in the political sphere. This explanation poses two challenges to the existing literature on the place of the armed forces in Turkish politics and proposes a theoretical framework that can travel beyond the Turkish experience. First, we argue that students of civil-military relations should directly engage the precipitous fall of the TAF, which is not easily explained by the existing accounts. The relevant processes through which the military was ousted from the political arena then can inform us about the future trajectory of Turkish democracy. The second challenge we pose, in turn, points toward how the conventional wisdom anachronistically projects into the past the image of a unitary and all too (politically) powerful TAF (which best applies to the 1980–2002 period). The ways in which the coups of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 were carried out, not to mention the decision-making processes behind them, can hardly be associated with an unchanging military. For example, the coup of 1960 was initiated by a handful of mid-ranking officers, while the post-modern coup of 1997 was conducted within the chain of command. We argue that exploration of the institutional evolution of the TAF vis-à-vis civil-military relations reveals key insights about not only its rapid downfall as a political actor but also its rise to prominence in the first place. In addition, we propose a theoretical framework that can help explain under what circumstances politically strong militaries can be “toppled” through countercoups. Finally, the paper offers a counterintuitive conclusion about the future of Turkish politics: the risk of a military coup launched by mid-ranking officers is considerably higher now than it was before the countercoups of 2007–11. The remainder of the paper unfolds in four sections. First, we highlight the central puzzle and situate it within the broader literature on Turkish civil-military relations. The second section provides a theoretical framework that can help us better understand the nature of countercoups. Third, we offer a historical narrative that traces the rise and fall of the TAF as a political actor. We conclude by highlighting a number of implications that follow from the theoretical framework and historical narrative. Defined broadly, the literature on civil-military relations deals with two kinds of questions: 1) the tension — or the “right” (desirable) balance — between civilian and military agents of the state,1 and 2) the conditions under which militaries intervene in and withdraw from politics. The case of Turkey has long occupied a substantial place in debates over both questions, with much of the effort going into the appropriate categorization of the TAF vis-à-vis existing models.2 In general, the TAF's influence in politics has usually been associated with a “light” version of praetorianism: “a situation where the military class of a given society exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of force.”3 Eric Nordlinger, on this concept, asserts that “military officers become praetorian soldiers when they threaten or use force in order to enter or dominate the political arena.”4 According to Nordlinger's classification of praetorianism — rule by a guardian or ruler5 — the TAF was usually seen as a “guardian.” In a similar fashion, the TAF can also be conceived as what Amos Perlmutter called an “arbitrator army,” operating behind the scenes as a pressure group or fomenting a fear of civilian retribution.6 The TAF's overwhelming role in politics is embedded in the very fabric of modern Turkey, founded in 1923 as a result of — in Samuel Huntington's classification7 — a revolutionary coup.8 The leading cadres of the republic, especially Mustafa Kemal, aimed at rapid modernization. This so-called “Kemalist conception”9 involved mainly the “adoption of Western political and cultural institutions, with no radical change in the existing social structure.”10 Mustafa Kemal “emphatically refused to identify Kemalism with any other ideological slogans, ... waving aside possible objections that this would leave the nature of the new political regime inappropriately vague.”11 Yet, the nemeses of the regime were well-defined. As Henri Barkey concludes, “The new Republican elite's passion for modernization, seen as an escape from backwardness, translated itself into a total dislike and distrust of all things associated with the and the of “The of Mustafa Kemal and his a in as a which was best by According to with a in his and considered cultural of and to be to The regime not have in the or out of the but it was in an and an a as well as an The TAF also a role in the of a modern and on the military, was the of the military from politics with the that the while in the should the the the only for a military to engage in politics was to from the force and become a civilian the other the military was as the only and to which the regime could be The of the of institutional and that eventually the for four coups between 1960 and not to mention an overbearing role for the military in Turkish politics from 1960 such a civil-military relations have occupied a central place in the literature on Turkish politics. In the relevant literature in both the and its has civil-military relations in the of The existing fall into 1) the institutional that the of political 2) that on the vis-à-vis the and that highlight the role by the These an about the of the TAF from the political the was to follow a we two challenges to the existing First, it not the TAF's of from politics. The trials that the political of the military are usually as a to an but for own about the of of the by the of the being in but in a only in The that the former of was as the of a and the of the as well as the long of the trials also about the and of the the process might have the literature has to this and considered the TAF's in that the countercoup as a We argue that this only the and nature of the puzzle: how did the TAF its political in such a In this is a question than usually The TAF was not only powerful in the political it was also a or at by the overwhelming of the The second challenge we to the existing literature the in and public debates to the TAF as a and political actor The conventional narrative an of the role of the military in the past with the of the 1980–2002 during which the TAF's political might and were The TAF was an actor in Turkish politics from 1923 but its rise to prominence as a unitary and political actor took place in a number of We argue that the institutional evolution of the TAF is best in two The first is the to which a to intervene in politics is and The second how and the military vis-à-vis and politics the such a the TAF's institutional evolution can be seen as a process during which 1) the to in politics has become increasingly and and 2) the army has an in the of politics. In the two we provide a theoretical framework and historical narrative that help the Turkish into As as it the literature deals with the ways in which politically powerful military forces are out of politics. this we on a framework by who on the between the of military forces and the civilian of the For the of the armed forces follow from the of two the of the army's (or, social within the and the to which the armed forces a role in to the between what a and a military like a when its is but its place in is such the role that the military in the and the as a political actor. The of a officers or within the military, for to to over the civilian with the a military himself as the of the the of in turn, to a military force that both a strong and a central role in political and In such the military of the its at the of both the and and the of the military In cases where the military a or the of the the armed forces to the but help the armed forces and even political The TAF, especially between 1960 and can easily be as a for the political of the civilian as well as was founded on both and a the Turkish has not an armed such as a or a force to mention a strong like the an of in turn, the the TAF it in political at both and to its strong of historical and the military has also been the in Turkey, with a of social the TAF has strong vis-à-vis the civilian of the especially it its political might with the coup of we can the TAF between 1960 and as a how can we explain its rough from while it not directly with the of armed forces from points a for when the of the armed forces is to and the military become to from civilian We argue especially in the modern is a second that can politically strong militaries to countercoups. armed forces and in politics as of while also the relevant and they up too of the long such would leave and too to pragmatic political agents who can the military. This second we can provide a explanation both for the rise and fall of the TAF as a political actor. The rise and fall of the TAF as a political actor is also a narrative of institutional evolution with to the military's to the of politics. The first two military in Turkey and were the and the decision-making than the last In time, the armed forces that the to intervene could be only if the officers The Turkish military also a of political and its became better over time, as by the “post-modern” coup of 1997. By the the TAF to or in politics as of its modus operandi. This also involved of relevant such as for coups case the JDP out of This to in politics had itself when political were but the JDP a in and also was by a pragmatic and The counterintuitive conclusion is that what the military increasingly powerful from the — its of the to in politics — eventually it and The TAF's The Republican Party in the two modern in In Mustafa that it was for Turkey to to a that a Turkey could its with the Western In the Party by former and would as the and the The a of and by of the to by the second of the of its the initiated a number of that might be as The was In addition, were from the in power could to At the same time, the numerous the on the of the to in the of from the over the the of and the of the of The rule and the it the military's members of the even Turkey an it was also — of such as military officers, were and from the new The that government a for the became the members of the all the the military did not from the TAF as a number of within the army had been as as the The social that new by 1960 as a for within the 1960, a of officers, the increasingly autocratic and “Islamic” and by the carried out a coup the and as well as the of the This was launched not only against the but also in of the chain of command. General was as the of the the that was a The coup eventually to the and of Prime Minister with his two an of the to which the military could in with politics. The while to to the to of its pivotal in The the rise of both in of to military officers and the army's political at the institutional asserts that in the of the are a of the political power and of the armed and no that military coups in the of military first coup to the that the military, especially in 1960, its power to its and other such the TAF also took to its political power and the TAF the an that the armed forces’ of the political sphere for The General was also considerably from the of the civilian government of any political of the the the also the nature of the The coup was by a power between and a series of within the military. The that came on through such as and as The for a new in as well as to keep the chain of the the military was still from a unitary political actor. Between and two coups were both initiated by an and the of the military was the of of the military that were not with the carried out 1960, or the of the came to power in his first in to a with Prime Minister In for his was not charged with any crimes but was to second a also This time, was on and was the last coup in Turkey, a in the TAF's of an and in politics. Between and the TAF as within the of a The TAF's influence in politics during this was as the might not have army The of the of the which had been in 1960, under a new the Justice Party The a in under the of the TAF in the political arena as a Turkish on the a in civil-military relations. By the and ideological to social and political The that to armed between and and the of politically armed and the government to By 1971, the government of the a group of the of the a — the so-called by — to Prime Minister to leave with the of or a military to This time, the to intervene came from within the General than a of the chain of was to a than it had been in The mode of was also not to mention was still no within the TAF the nature and of its involvement in politics. The military was from a on the General especially between the and the of who had about the of the as well as the to be officers and a total by the that an a would be In before the of 1971, a group of officers who and a of the government a coup on It was by the leading cadres of the of who the coup itself to the within the military was from but the order still especially when with the coup of The of in turn, also the and of the army's involvement in was the TAF's in even the military to the the political the was a from the of the TAF's role in that no now in with the military, the latter was better able to itself from was only the TAF's involvement in politics became even two of rule by of the TAF from the political influence had become The the were by the kinds of that had the with the social and political by political between radical and two challenges for the First, especially the of in members of the Turkish military to become of political the of society had to the military, a to the TAF's a also to the TAF's to a coup in only was this coup and the of the army also even in the The military, under its and as a to the the TAF numerous to the The came with the The in to a for — a for from the of the military the TAF took over the were and for from politics. General was to over a government by with the TAF took a in the of politics. The military the of a new in which was by numerous aimed at social The new aimed to and make the even it was still an that the would be the powerful within the armed forces and that the of the Turkish General would of any As to the social the TAF aimed to political as well as actual and an and the ideological with its own of At the same time, the military to support an as the best against and The military also that and as well as a that had no but military rule for the of The army to the but only and its presence in the political sphere. It had its as a of the political and was to use to the The the rise of political in Turkish politics. In Party than of the and eventually was able to become a in the During his as a number of public about his to and to an an and an and to an attracted from the TAF, which considered itself the guardian of the In the TAF, now as a political to the and from the political sphere. The and the of had become within the TAF that it was able to an elected government even an actual in the of the of the military to engage in an and were to General for on the of political and the of Prime Minister and his This a of the on at which the government was to to a of to the influence of political was to and the was The of and his did not there. The Party to of the was also to of and was on and to by The TAF's to the political even the of the military with to in political and social to be associated with the were through campaigns or with and the TAF pressure on and that it considered to be in with the The military's also to the sphere. the TAF the civilian government to a series of that the number of students at at a in two First, was from to to the of which to provide for and the TAF the of a that the of from a students who to from in the first by the that In the TAF to the influence of through and This also its in not only but social As “The of Party ... the in the for the that has been The of a government by the which to The of the was former Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a former of who had in for public the in of The JDP's rise to prominence the the JDP was the of the now by a and who had no for In the first of his Erdoğan a vis-à-vis the military, Erdoğan was able to numerous the as well as the support of the from the so-called to and who had the TAF's involvement in politics. The JDP also its to to the which came with about the armed forces’ from the political sphere. The first between the JDP and the TAF took place in 2007, the of The JDP had at the and a of the In 2007, over to mention that his a an for a first the TAF launched what has to be as an a on the TAF's institutional that the armed forces might not The to but it the ways in which the army's involvement in politics had become sophisticated and As to the during the 1980 in the TAF, in 2007, to influence politics through an The JDP's in turn, itself between 2007 and in 2007 and on his as a in Erdoğan took the risk of the military, if putting his weight behind two against members of the Ergenekon and are and both trials were on that a number of key TAF members had long been against the government and coup with the of the JDP government if it over a the armed forces’ to an The also ranging from campaigns from to as well as political and in order to the political that — given political — could be as a for a The JDP's to place its on the Ergenekon and trials to the TAF's overbearing in politics was, to be if the trials had they might have was on the that the Turkish army was to up and out political to the of political that would military given its involvement in politics and the of that the JDP also had an even the TAF's that the army might have for the that the JDP might into and autocratic the JDP and putting its weight behind the Ergenekon and trials while also public support for its In the Ergenekon which toward the of military and and in and in an for the government to and and than in the past, the balance between and military in of elected The public that from the as a the a of to a in June the for the first in the for civilian to military in for crimes to the of This the military's the than TAF members were charged with and about of and were in The of the TAF in the political sphere was then in 2011, when the of as well as the of the and Forces from the associated with the This was a first in the TAF's the of its overbearing presence in the political sphere. this the TAF to be and to the of the to in politics. This is not to that institutional Turkish cultural change — especially in the of the rise of — and did not in the a explanation of the TAF's defeat at power a game in which it had excelled for we that we the of its institutional As counterintuitive as it what the army the force in politics eventually it it to a launched by a pragmatic and political actor. The have two The first which in the literature on civil-military relations. to the of the armed forces from the political sphere in of hardly to the power between the military and its we that of to civil-military relations in with this article, we to to the broader literature in two to the of the armed forces from politics as a power and to offer a theoretical framework to help us understand how politically militaries can be by civilian if the in this paper have of the It can into Samuel Huntington's army,” the best for both the military and Turkish The the the of the countercoup might eventually the and of the TAF as a is the risk of a coup initiated by officers, a risk that has not at since when the TAF the to intervene in politics. This become of a in the of the The JDP to the very institutional and the army had over in order to involved in politics. This is for Turkish democracy. the of the military's involvement also a especially in the of the social tensions that during the Gezi Park protests of as a military has become a coup is now than it was a for the to intervene in politics such a coup as this paper is for it is from The behind the post-modern coup of 1997 that they had initiated a process that would last for a This should as a to students of Turkish especially in the of the political and tensions that the The Turkish political is a that the to to a

Chose · Media studies · Middle East · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Turkish · Classics · History · Law · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts · Middle East Politics and Society · Philosophy · Turkey's Politics and Society

• China and the Islamic World

  Robert R Bianchi•China and the Islamic World•2019

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