Turkey and Iran after the Arab Spring

When the political landscape in the Middle East appeared on the brink of transformation back in early 2011, Turkey and Iran, for different reasons, were delighted. Each envisioned an extension of its national sphere of influence. Both Ankara and Tehran declared themselves the standard bearers for “democratic” rule and civilian empowerment. For Ankara, this regional transformation was, in the words of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, a “normalization” process — a quest for good governance and integration into the international community. The tide was thought to be turning towards the eclectic Turkish model, a combination of local traditions with the universal practices of democracy, human rights and a market economy. A series of early events seemed to confirm that the Turkish model for political conciliation and regional economic integration was emerging as the new political norm in the Middle East. Tehran was no less hopeful at the beginning. Iran's revolutionary prophecy seemed justified in view of the Islamists’ determinative roles. In this Islamic Awakening, Western-supported leaders were being overthrown one after another. Given the traditional nature of Iranian-Arab relations, Iran stood aside at the outset to let events take their course with the expectation that the chaos would resolve itself in the form of an Iranian-type enghelab (revolution). These reflections were not just home-grown pipe dreams. The “Turkish model” and the “Islamic Awakening” were regularly featured in international headlines. For Western policy makers, the former offered an agreeable, even encouraging prospect. It meant not only political reconstruction in Western terms; it was also thought to be a more sustainable form of governance, given local democratic support for the emerging political formations. Eventually, Ankara hoped to benefit from an elevated political status, serving as a source of inspiration for the Arab countries. By contrast, the Iranian model, which to some sounded equally feasible, was deemed a serious threat. Under that scenario, Western links with the region would be severed, and Israel would face heightened security risks. As such, a possible extension of the “resistance front” was construed as the natural offshoot of declining U.S. engagement in the Middle East. With these prospects long gone, Turkey and Iran now face an increasing number of challenges and threats. This comes on top of other rivalries and security dilemmas in the Middle East. At this juncture both countries need to rethink and recalibrate their policies accordingly. The existence of a de facto Islamic state within the boundaries of Iraq and Syria is testament to a regional atmosphere plagued by continual upheavals. This article suggests a realpolitik turn for both countries, with necessary coordination on a number of policies, not out of choice but necessity. Following the initial phase, the Arab Spring proved to be a hard sell for all parties. Structurally, it unmade the region's political dynamics without putting in place any other order. A new particularistic consciousness seemed to threaten the already weakened transnational ties in the Arab world. The concept of “national” had lost its postcolonial meaning, overshadowed by sectarian and tribal identities. The newfound ethos not only hardened the regional quest for stability; it also failed to address the public desire for a political system that respected the values of faith, honor, dignity, good governance, and civic and economic rights. In the context of such political instability, the need for a new definition of citizenship and, more important, a foundation of political legitimacy, poses even greater challenges. Having tested Westernism, pan-Arabism and nationalism in the past, the regional dynamics are now pointing to Islamism as the new structural foundation.1 Yet the problems that have arisen have more to do with reconciling Islam with other political and cultural identities than with the issue of Islam's mass appeal. There are essentially five main hurdles to transforming the current regional landscape into a number of functional political systems. The first concerns how to combine Islam and globalization — how to meld cultural autonomy with global homogenization in relation to social, economic and possibly political best practices. The second is to negotiate alternative domestic-regional ideational claims vis-à-vis majoritarian Sunni or Shia identities. Here, the rights of political minorities need to be better protected, and indeed extended, against a rising tide of sectarian and religious intolerance. Third, the growing insecurity both across and within sectarian groups (Sunnis and Shias) further complicates the fragile security structures of the region. Fourth, there is an urgent need for economic transformation, given the discontent over youth unemployment, income and the gender gap, and the diminution of public services. But the post-Arab Spring transitional countries have neither the financial resources nor the support of third parties, which are bound up in their own domestic issues. Anchoring the region to a stable pole is currently not an option. At the same time, external sources of financial aid represent various challenges. The IMF packages are problematic; cash from the Gulf States and Iran comes with strings attached; and Western financial aid is minimal and entails painful preconditions. These responses are likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the situation. Finally, the initial public support for democratic reform has been overshadowed by a growing sense of insecurity and instability. This is rooted in the absence of international action in support of popular demands and a strong regional drive to stem the tide of the “disruption,” as it has been perceived. The former has led to sustained Western inaction in certain cases (e.g., Bahrain), while the latter has brought about proxy wars along the fault lines in others (e.g., Syria). The nexus between the Western world and the Middle East, on the other hand, has been irrevocably severed. Due to a series of financial, political and global developments, the West is staying away from new military or political entanglements. For the Europeans to respond in this way could have been anticipated to some extent, but when the United States abstained from assuming the responsibilities that it formerly had been eager to undertake, the countries in transition felt deserted. Moreover, the Western public has become alienated following a media campaign that has placed extremism at the heart of the regional dynamics. At this juncture, it looks as if the West will prefer to yield to any solution that overcomes the lesser evil as opposed to the imagined alternatives similar to Afghanization or Talibanization. Prospects for relations between the region and the West do not appear promising. Against this stark backdrop, the regional countries share an inescapable responsibility to ensure political stability. Egypt is handicapped; Jordan and Lebanon face internal political divisions and are saddled with Syrian refugees. The Gulf monarchies, save Saudi Arabia, do not have the political clout to match their economic prowess and are themselves vulnerable. The North African states have historically been delinked from the Arabian Peninsula. Iraq and Syria have collapsed. Thus, Turkey and Iran, with their relatively stable domestic political systems, are in a unique position to take the lead. Without their engagement, stability and security in the Middle East will remain unattainable. The current chaos puts their own domestic domains at serious risk, yet conciliation between Ankara and Tehran has become even more difficult due to their divergent foreign-policy agendas. The Arab Spring has both posed challenges and offered opportunities. Turkey tested the roiled waters by declaring a willingness to lead the change, rather than resisting it or standing aside. Ankara expected this to position it strongly in a stakeholder role in the immediate aftermath of what was initially envisaged as a short-term period of unrest. But, of course, there has been a significant gap between the hope and the reality in the last three years. Rather than a swift breakthrough, the region has been crippled by securitization, civil war, sectarian strife and power rivalries. Turkey's engagement with the Arab Spring rested on three pillars: humanitarian protection, security and regional diplomacy. On the humanitarian front, Turkish efforts have had significant and largely underappreciated success. It has hosted more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees, in stark contrast to the EU, which was in the process of developing ties with the region through the so-called Neighborhood Policy. Despite heavy costs, Turkey has continued to maintain an open-door policy and has absorbed the increased spillover of the crisis into the regional and international environment. Turkey has provided economic and humanitarian assistance to almost all the countries in transition, for the most part drawing upon its own financial and institutional capacity. Ankara considers humanitarian and development aid as an asset in regional policy. In fact, this has provided an unexpected opportunity for Turkey to connect with the Arab peoples and to assume a constructive insider's role in region-specific affairs. Yet the growing security threats have undermined the integrationist and humanitarian vision that Turkey has endeavored to project. Turkey has reinforced its security ties with NATO and the Western alliance. This policy, however, is not only precarious and inadequate; it might also prove incompatible with Ankara's long-term regional goals. Above all, Turkey should avoid further securitization. This requires adopting a balanced discourse, because Turkey has largely built its influence through soft power. Greater emphasis on security risks eroding Turkey's outreach and positioning it as a typical regional-power competitor. Turkish officials would be well advised to avoid risking the country's democratic credentials in the face of heightened security concerns. Turkey has described itself as an order-instituting country in the region; this implicitly includes a security-provider role. Yet Turkey's claim hinges not on hard security assets, but rather on its integrationist vision, aimed at reconciling differences and supporting win-win outcomes. This role requires careful diplomacy, with nuanced approaches to each actor, in addition to the difficult task of building norms and institutions in a highly unstable environment. On this basis, Turkey must overhaul its position against the emerging balances in the Middle East. This forces Turkey to reconfigure its regional diplomatic strategy. An inability to harmonize policy preferences with regional proclivities hindered Turkey's progress following a promising start. Despite the merits of its self-declared agenda to pursue regional peace and stability, Turkey fell out with the Saudi-UAE line in Egypt and with Iran in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the reconciliation process with Israel has not yet materialized. These setbacks have curtailed Turkey's further cooperation with both the United States and Russia, though for different reasons. Turkey fell out with the Saudi-UAE line in Egypt and with Iran in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the reconciliation process with Israel has not yet materialized. Worse still, Ankara's “proactive diplomacy” has lost ground in relation to two policy goals: empowering the moderates and crowding out the extremists. The unintended consequence has been the rise of radicalism and sectarianism throughout the region. While this was not directly of Turkey's making, it remains the case that Ankara underutilized its mediation role and stood unable to project its vision. This might in part be a consequence of the unexpected level of Western detachment from regional affairs. The regional rivalry has also become more destructive, particularly following the involvement of Iran and Saudi Arabia in a war of attrition in Syria. However, one should also note that, while the Turkish policy goal to “stand behind the peoples, not [illegitimate] regimes” had merit in its early phases, it turned out to be a major barrier to finding a political middle ground. Ankara's reading of events was not totally at odds with reality. Turkey warned its Western and regional interlocutors against the looming threats of sectarianism and extremism. While the West missed one opportunity after another to attempt to halt the downward spiral into chaos, regional powerhouses like Iran and Saudi Arabia exploited the vacuum to pursue their own visions for regional hegemony. Unable to confront them on its own, Turkey fell prey to further securitization. Nonetheless, the failure to stand firm on the integrationist model cannot vitiate Turkey's stance toward the chaos. The Turks are no foreigners to realpolitik and have cleverly hedged their potential losses by working around the disintegration. A particularly shrewd was to ground with the This not only Turkey's it is also likely to as a against domestic and regional with an need for is working on up alternative Given these efforts — which are likely to yield an nexus with both and and possibly — Turkey through the current This would Turkey to better connect with against the growing of With on Turkey the of the which is more likely to than their regional An in the of a sectarian is Turkey as part of a Sunni the Shia groups by Iran in Iraq and Ankara's this has a and The West and the this Turkey from The have it to the of the Turkish sphere of influence. However, Turkish policy this sectarian that it is of Turkish policies and vision. In one way or Turkey to this which also links it to Ankara's of this have largely on Thus, Turkey to do more than issue to avoid like the diplomatic crisis in that Turkish should its on regional security and for security In to its of economic and integration with the Turkey must the gap between Ankara to on the that it a against a between the Sunni and Shia as well as against the The West should the Turkish role as an asset and its potential role to an between the two Iran monarchies, and the their political The countries in transition need to that, to some extent, Turkish involvement will the Arab As the are by the of Iran and Saudi Arabia, Turkey a political power Turkish clout was in their financial the Gulf states failed to political The same is in Turkey's engagement has a determinative in the of regional about putting on In Ankara should with both the and Sunni groups in to maintain the country's The on the other hand, should that the Turkish role is in the region from turning into an Iran was declared an early in the of the Arab The was that with the of long the Iranian up as the last of the in the Middle East. The expectation was that Tehran would need to to the current in to avoid These failed to to Iran's to project power its at a when other major were for With to its Iran not to on which had it to maintain and its on Shia groups in different countries. While the choice of as domestic provided a with the Western the of extremism Iran as a potential The is by most of the region's leaders as a major to the regional power This is not provided the United States not the of the Iranian over regional about Iran's of Moreover, possible Iranian involvement could the regional more sustainable and the of Iran could also the role of the Middle East in global through against growing from East and Tehran also has the potential to the groups into the regional dynamics. the West to have to Iran in This has to first of all, with a to the which would a and military Iran has to be as an to a growing Sunni and even Third, with on the Iran's into the global and its potential as a market would a political for Iran's declining in the Arab world and its will be hard to in is likely to the view that Iran is an in the region. The other of the is the to of the Iranian state Tehran has not its regional policy its For Iran, the Middle East is to its Iran would by a Sunni that Tehran will remain by the in Syria. Iran both the and the and to with In it stood behind sectarian and is now to project itself as the against to the power balances in the Iran has to the it to it could do through the of and Foreign Minister Finally, Iran will the chaos on Western or Sunni on which better its There also remain significant to Iran's an in the regional order. the Arab Spring has the against with Western As a Tehran will now have to some of a of universal appeal. This might prove even more Tehran has its hope of with the Arab after the In an attempt to avoid Iran has others of in that has the country's declining in the Arab world and its will be hard to in is likely to the view that Iran is an in the region. On that Tehran might to its efforts to rather than hope Yet Iran is putting its at in both Iraq and for is the Iranian Iran might face an even more with the potential of following a U.S. Iran is not likely to there is a combination of domestic and international dynamics that forces it to do In addition to these security Iran's to the Arab Spring has been to possible transnational which Tehran as a to its model of political This is rooted in the failure to its with other Islamic It has yet to its internal political which requires major political has been to regional to from domestic a sense of Iran has also an view of Sunni to the that it is now to the ground for security cooperation with the As such, Tehran it stand firm on external against threats from The Iranian also this will it to its traditional for its domestic This would security cooperation with the West at the regional while an domestic and foreign-policy vision. The of Sunni and, even the of will sectarianism as an of regional and national Iran's of the sectarian have the of the to regional and the like the is totally on However, the Iranian will need to rethink the security threats that have not only undermined its in but also it on a course with the extremists. Tehran would be better advised to the Sunni for and to the moderates in to In the of possible against the in Iraq and Iran's inability to would the as However, the of might be than in Syria. Thus, given the that regional its internal Tehran to recalibrate its current The Iranian to this at there an opportunity for sustainable domestic that the of the is a in to the of international Iran will to in any and is likely to the as the of its and Following this first Iran is likely to to its regional through of Western influence or even through cooperation with the The rise of and for and should Turkey and Iran into a middle ground. These a to the dynamics of both the regional and their domestic Iran's claim to have the Sunni forces is now by its inability to a possible to and even and and Shia have the course in the country to the brink of Iran's on rule not only the of it has also the and sectarian On the other hand, has The and the sense of are the for The of Iraq would have a on both Turkey and Iran at this With Iraq international has been on the back of international The is also likely to Turkey's and will have domestic It is to a the of regional Turkey and Iran could a against and that there are certain that could their policies, possible spillover and regional by out to other regional and global there must be a regional to the This would Iran and Turkey to out to other power in the region; the need to on the current neither Iran nor Turkey nor Saudi Arabia as a power in the Middle East. While and other forces to the a of is to maintain a sustainable Syria remains a in Iran has and in in of its economic at Worse still, the has Lebanon and Iraq and could them as of Iran's power strategy. Turkey also to away from the growing crisis in it domestic support for its regional policy. It has already its international Ankara no of stability without while Tehran is about a Syria. This is a gap, provided both on a transitional that would their concerns as well as on the ground. The is the domestic to domestic and regional Third, there is an urgent to regional about a might certain but the political leaders need to that any to the current could only to the power rivalries and security the nor the Sunni should be in their which could only to On the other hand, both and Sunni need to their about the current political order. Turkey and Iran should the domestic power in Iraq on of standing for and an is likely to regional support even from countries that on other Turkey's peace process and the integration of into the national political system would in Syria and Iran, the toward regional that national reconciliation and as the policies in these three for further thought on to an political and security This is an opportunity for Turkey and Iran to for the middle ground by and their regional The alternative is to be further into the of regional and domestic Turkey and Iran are political with long of engagement in the Middle East. The to policy ground rather than against the current tide in Tehran and

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• State, region and order

  Bülent Aras, Emirhan Yorulmazlar•Third World Quarterly•2016

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