Erdoğan and the Demise of the Secular Republic

Michael M. Gunter, Erdogan's Path to Authoritarianism: The Continuing Journey. Lexington Books, 2024. 194 pages. $100, hardcover. Gönül Tol, Erdoğan's War: A Strongman's Struggle at Home and in Syria. Oxford University Press, 2023. 332 pages. $37.50, hardcover. Pınar Bedirhanoğlu, Çağlar Dölek, Funda Hülagü, and Özlem Kaygusuz, Turkey's New State in the Making: Transformations in Legality, Economy and Coercion. Zed Books, 2020. 320 pages. $40.95, paper. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the most powerful, destructive, and revanchist leader of modern Turkey. He has dominated national power since 2003, but he singlehandedly reshaped the political landscape after his election as mayor of Istanbul the decade before. The strongman has replaced the old republic, which identified with Enlightenment values, with a state that is autocratic, lacking the rule of law, and Islamically oriented; freedom of speech, along with critical thinking, is dead. This is a clear case of state capture, in which a leader seizes control of state institutions to serve his or her own interests, blurring the lines between personal power and institutional authority.1 In Turkey, Erdoğan has eroded the independence of checks on his authority, turning them into tools to criminalize the opposition and reward loyalists. The books I discuss in this review essay offer the best evidence of how Erdoğan captured the state and created a republic of fear.2 Michael Gunter's Erdoğan's Path to Authoritarianism provides a comprehensive analysis of the president's rise, his political strategies, and his transformation of Turkey. Gunter examines Erdoğan's career, from his early days in urban politics to his current role as the central figure in the country's politics, focusing on his consolidation of control over national institutions.3 The study begins with Erdoğan's upbringing in a conservative, working-class Istanbul neighborhood and his early involvement in political Islam. Gunter describes Erdoğan's entry into politics through the Welfare Party and his later formation of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001, which would become the vehicle for his ascendance. The book highlights how Erdoğan initially presented himself as a moderate, pro-Western leader seeking to integrate Turkey into the European Union, while slowly shifting toward authoritarianism. Here, Gunter misses an opportunity to show that this process was a way of seeking legitimacy. But he aptly relates how Erdoğan and the AKP gradually dismantled the secularist, Kemalist foundations of the state. The author demonstrates that Erdoğan concentrated power through a series of constitutional changes that undermined the independence of the judiciary and subdued the military's traditional role as the guardian of secularism. This culminated in the transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system, allowing Erdoğan to further centralize authority. A significant portion of the book focuses on Erdoğan's turning his country into an open prison where fear dominates public life. He has suppressed opposition, both from political rivals and civil society. Gunter details the repression of the Kurdish movement, the jailing of journalists and academics, and the silencing of dissent through state control of the media. The volume also analyzes the failed coup attempt in July 2016, which Gunter argues was a pivotal moment allowing Erdoğan to accelerate his authoritarian agenda and consolidate power. In its aftermath, tens of thousands of people were purged from the military, judiciary, and civil service. Gunter's book provides a critical overview of how Erdoğan has managed to retain power despite economic difficulties and growing opposition, while also highlighting the domestic and international consequences of his leadership. However, the author adds: “The Turkish president has probably bitten off more than he can chew. Instead of zero problems buffered by a strategic depth, Turkey is likely to find itself increasingly mired in a deepening quagmire teeming with a multitude of problems” (p. 22). Gunter delves into Erdoğan's foreign policy, particularly his shift toward a more assertive and independent stance in the Middle East. The book investigates Erdoğan's involvement in the Syrian conflict, his deteriorating relations with the West, and his aspiration to position Turkey as a regional power with neo-Ottoman influences. Erdoğan's foreign policies have been unpredictable, and one of the best studies of this issue is Gönül Tol's Erdoğan's War. Through primary documents and interviews, Tol provides an in-depth analysis of the strongman's complex and strategic use of war as a political tool. The volume shows how Erdoğan has leveraged both domestic and international conflicts to consolidate his power, neutralize opposition, and reshape his country as more authoritarian, nationalist, and militarized. Tol, an expert on Turkey, draws on historical, political, and sociological frameworks to explain Erdoğan's weaponization of war narratives and military engagements to serve his long-term goals. The book begins by charting Erdoğan's political evolution from young Islamist politician in Istanbul to dominant figure. Tol, who provides much better ethnographic details of Erdoğan's early life, emphasizes his steady drift away from democratic and pro-European ideals. The use of war—both real military engagements and metaphorical conflicts against perceived enemies—emerges as a central theme in Erdoğan's strategy to stay in power. Tol highlights how he has carefully managed domestic and foreign conflicts to present himself as the only leader capable of defending the nation against external and internal threats. As with the Gunter study, Tol examines how Erdoğan instrumentalized the Kurdish question to rally his Islamo-nationalist base. She argues that the president has oscillated between peace negotiations and military repression, depending on his political needs. During the early years of his rule, Erdoğan pursued a peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), hoping to secure votes from that ethnic group and position himself as a leader capable of resolving one of Turkey's most intractable conflicts. However, when the dynamics shifted—particularly after the electoral success of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)—Erdoğan launched a military campaign against the PKK, using the conflict to rally nationalist support and weaken the HDP's political influence. The book provides a detailed account of Erdoğan's role in the Syrian civil war, as he shifted from initially backing anti-Assad forces to conducting military operations in Syria's north. Tol contends that he used the Syrian conflict to pursue multiple objectives: containing Kurdish forces affiliated with the PKK, expanding Turkey's regional influence, and projecting himself as a protector of Sunni Muslims. By framing Turkey's involvement as a defense of national security, Erdoğan justified increased interventions and reinforced his image as a strong, decisive leader on the international stage. Tol further explores Erdoğan's neo-Ottoman vision of Turkey as a regional hegemon. His interventions in Libya and the eastern Mediterranean, and his assertive stance in the Caucasus during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, are seen as part of a broader strategy to assert the country's power. Tol argues that Erdoğan has also used these conflicts to strengthen his domestic support base by appealing to nationalist and Islamist sentiments. One of the most critical turning points in Erdoğan's political trajectory, according to Tol, was the failed coup in July 2016. The attempt allowed the president to intensify his war narrative and justify a widespread crackdown on opponents, including the movement led by dissident cleric Fethullah Gülen, Kurds, leftists, and secularists. Tol argues that Erdoğan framed the coup as an attack not only on his presidency but on the Turkish state and its sovereignty. This allowed him to intensify purges within the military, judiciary, and civil service, effectively neutralizing opposition and solidifying his grip on power. Tol delves into Erdoğan's skillful use of Turkey's polarization to create a sense of permanent crisis. By portraying groups like the secular elite, the Gülenists, the Kurdish population, and opposition parties as enemies of the state, he has maintained a continuous “war” against internal enemies. This strategy, Tol argues, has allowed him to manipulate public opinion, rally his base, and marginalize political foes. The president's control over the media has been central to this strategy, as state-controlled and pro-government outlets amplify the war narrative and paint a picture of Erdoğan as the nation's protector. The book also addresses Erdoğan's framing of domestic economic troubles as a form of warfare being waged against Turkish sovereignty by external powers, particularly the West. Erdoğan has used hardships such as the depreciation of the lira and rising inflation to rally nationalist sentiment. By claiming that economic difficulties are the result of foreign intervention, Erdoğan shifts blame away from his own policies and solidifies his narrative of Turkey's being under siege. A major part of Tol's analysis focuses on how Erdoğan has deliberately militarized Turkish society. By crafting policies that glorify military action, establishing paramilitary groups loyal to the AKP, and promoting a hyper-nationalist discourse, he has shifted the country away from pursuing democratic reforms. Tol highlights how this militarization has penetrated education, media, and public expression, creating a more authoritarian and aggressive political culture. From military interventions abroad to the suppression of domestic opposition, Erdoğan has masterfully created a sense of perpetual conflict, positioning himself as the indispensable leader capable of defending Turkey's sovereignty. Tol's book sheds light on the consequences of this militarization and authoritarianism for Turkey's domestic politics and its international relations, and how Erdoğan has entrenched his power. These profound political, social, and institutional transformations, particularly during the 2010s, are explored in the edited volume Turkey's New State in the Making. The authors argue that the state has shifted from a bureaucratic, semi-democratic order to a more centralized, authoritarian regime where the rule of law has been systematically weakened. Key institutions, such as the judiciary, that once served as checks on executive power have been brought under Erdoğan's control. This has resulted in a legal framework that is increasingly arbitrary, with laws applied selectively to benefit those aligned with the AKP and punish those who oppose it. The rule of law has been instrumentalized to serve political ends, eroding democratic governance. Another theme of the book is how the AKP's economic policies have furthered the transformation of the state. Erdoğan focused on concentrating wealth among party-aligned business elites, creating an oligarchic structure. The AKP also used state resources and public contracts to reward supporters, deepening clientelism and undermining fairness. The construction sector has played a crucial role in maintaining the party's patronage networks, driving growth but also contributing to unsustainable debt and inequality. The book explores how the AKP has used coercion to maintain its hold on power, particularly after the failed 2016 coup. This includes not only the direct use of state violence but also the securitization of various aspects of Turkish society. The authors show how Erdoğan's government has expanded the role of military and security forces in civilian life, using them as tools to suppress dissent. The creation of paramilitaries, the issuing of emergency decrees, and the targeting of political opponents through state apparatuses are part of a broader strategy to militarize politics and neutralize opposition. Much of Turkey's transformation has been due to the AKP's control over the media. The book analyzes how Erdoğan has systematically silenced independent outlets—which have been bought up by pro-AKP business groups—and used state media to propagate the party's message. The shrinking of the public sphere, where open debate and criticism of the government are increasingly dangerous, has resulted in a media environment that largely serves as a tool for Erdoğan's propaganda. Critical coverage has been outlawed, with many journalists imprisoned or forced into exile. All three books argue that Erdoğan's reliance on war, whether literal or rhetorical, has transformed Turkey into a more polarized, authoritarian, and militarized state. This has affected the country's democracy, stability, and place in the world. The studies are valuable resources for understanding the trajectory of the strongman's political career, the institutional changes in Turkey, and the broader implications for democracy, governance, and authoritarianism in the 21st century. Although none of these volumes uses the term “state capture,” I would argue that it best describes Erdoğan's actions. Under his leadership, there has been a deliberate replacement of independent, merit-based public officials with loyalists. Positions in the judiciary, military, police, and civil service have increasingly been filled by individuals aligned with Erdoğan and the AKP, ensuring that these institutions no longer serve as neutral arbiters of state affairs but as extensions of Erdoğan's power. This undermines the separation of powers and weakens checks and balances, centralizing authority in the executive branch. One of the most important aspects of state capture in Turkey has been the restructuring of the judiciary. Following the failed coup attempt in 2016, the government purged tens of thousands of judges, prosecutors, and civil servants, accusing them of being affiliated with the Gülen movement. This allowed Erdoğan to appoint cronies and diminish the judiciary's ability to check executive power. The Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors were greatly impacted, weakening the rule of law. The legal system has thus been weaponized to target opposition parties, activists, and civil-society organizations, eliminating political competition. Leaders from the pro-Kurdish HDP and other opposition figures have been imprisoned, and protests have been suppressed. Many other institutions have been captured, these books demonstrate. Erdoğan's control of the media allows him to shape public narratives, amplify his message, and silence the opposition. The electoral process has also been affected. While voting continues to take place, Erdoğan has tilted the playing field in his favor through changes in laws, gerrymandering, and his media capture. The result is a system that increasingly favors the ruling party, undermining genuine competition and democratic accountability. Further, Erdoğan has effectively used state resources, including economic tools, public contracts, and patronage networks, to reinforce his backing among business elites and party supporters. Institutions and funds are directed to those aligned with the AKP, and the executive branch controls critical sectors of the economy, such as construction and energy, to reward friendly business groups and marginalize opponents. The Turkish military has historically maintained an independent base of power, allowing it to serve as a check on civilian governments and provide guardianship over secularism and national security. Erdoğan has managed to subdue the armed forces, particularly after the coup, through purges, trials, and restructuring, placing them under the control of loyal officials. This has ensured that one of the traditional restrictions on executive power no longer poses a threat to his authority. State capture under Erdoğan has also involved the rollback of civil liberties, particularly freedom of expression, assembly, and political dissent. Erdoğan similarly transformed foreign policy institutions through politicization and the practice of state capture. Over time, he diminished the influence of traditional institutions like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Armed Forces, centralizing power within the presidency. Following a 2017 constitutional referendum, which changed Turkey into a presidential republic, Erdoğan consolidated control over all policy making, including foreign and security affairs, relying heavily on his inner circle. Initially constrained by Turkey's civilian and military bureaucracy, as well as its alliances with the United States and the European Union, Erdoğan gradually eliminated these influences. He stigmatized diplomats as elitists and sidelined the foreign affairs ministry by appointing loyalists to key ambassadorial roles. His political allies and the security services, particularly the National Intelligence Agency, took on greater responsibilities in foreign policy, bypassing diplomatic norms. Erdoğan's approach led to the creation of new agencies and an increase in Turkish embassies abroad, especially in Africa. This has broader implications for Turkey's foreign relations, as policy under Erdoğan is highly personal, unpredictable, and less multilateral, with decisions often based on relationships and domestic political survival. The result of this state capture has been a transformation of Turkey from a pluralistic democracy into a competitive authoritarian regime. While formal structures like elections and political parties remain, their functionality and integrity have been undermined. Institutions meant to operate independently now serve to reinforce Erdoğan's rule. The personalization of state power is evident in his increasing ability to govern without constraint due to the effective elimination of checks that are critical in a functioning democracy. By controlling the bureaucracy, judiciary, media, and military, Erdoğan has reshaped the state to ensure that its institutions maintain his power and suppress opposition, pushing Turkey toward authoritarianism. However, despite this state capture, Erdoğan was strongly rebuked in the local elections of March 2024. The opposition outpolled the AKP 37.7 percent to 33.5 percent as it won mayoralties in Turkey's five largest cities: Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, and Antalya.4 When the results were in, the president acknowledged what in effect was his worst performance since first obtaining power in 2002, describing the results as “not only a loss of votes but also a loss of soul and blood.” Erdoğan has visibly aged, and it is unlikely that another political figure is positioned to inherit his legacy. Sooner rather than later, Turkey will be forced to come to grips with his inevitable retirement

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