The Room Where It Happened

In his tell-all account of his brief time serving as the national security adviser in the Trump White House, John Bolton describes, in more than 500 pages, many troubling aspects of the Trump presidency during that period, making the book a bestseller. That narrative, however, largely overshadows the very real policy mayhem of the Trump administration, policies that, in almost all cases, Bolton championed. Bolton's account is the story of America's reputational decline and outlier status in the international community under Trump. John Bolton was Donald Trump's third national security adviser (NSA), serving in that position from April 9, 2018, through September 10, 2019—as noted on the book's jacket, a period of just 453 days. In his book, however, Bolton frequently refers to instances in which he advised Trump on policy issues prior to becoming NSA and comments at length on Trump foreign policies that he long advocated and supported even prior to his appointment. Thus, the account that follows covers the breadth of Bolton's advocacy for, support of, and involvement in Trump's foreign-policy decisions, particularly those concerning the Middle East, the focus of this journal. Early in the book Bolton reminds the reader that he had served in three previous Republican administrations, those of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush. And he notes that he was prepared to serve again, as “eight years of Barack Obama meant there was much to repair.” During the Trump transition he had offered his services as secretary of state; in his view, “State needed a cultural revolution to be an effective instrument of policy.” But this was not to be: Bolton repeatedly notes (with some apparent pride) that, such was his reputation, he could never be confirmed for a government position that required Senate approval (secretary of state does; NSA does not). Despite being known for his hawkish policy advocacy, Bolton has long been a poster child of Vietnam War dodging, a “hawk” who took steps to avoid combat during his draft-eligible years (though not steps as egregious as Trump's bone spurs). In The Room Where It Happened, Bolton reveals several other defining aspects of his character and mindset. One is hubris, reflected in his use of a prominent line from the theatrical hit “Hamilton” as his book's title. In the play, Alexander Hamilton uses “the room where it happens” to refer to being involved in decisions shaping the emerging new nation of the United States of America. Do not be misled; John Bolton is no Alexander Hamilton. A second insight into Bolton that is reiterated throughout his tome: his antipathy for the media. Almost every reference to the press includes gratuitous aspersions: “the press mob shambled in”; “success even the hostile media could not diminish”; “the tremendous dishonesty of the press”; “sadly for the press, nothing went wrong”; “a New York Times story, filled with even more than the usual quota of mistakes.” Of course, Trump, whose repeated description of the media as “the enemy of the people,” is in a league by himself in vilifying the press. Third, Bolton repeatedly displays his contempt for diplomacy. He cites more than a dozen international treaties and agreements that he is pleased the United States never joined or for which he successfully advocated US withdrawal. There is not one mention of a treaty Bolton supports or believes provides benefit to the United States or the international community. It is this mentality, widespread among neoconservatives such as Bolton, that has led to the US status as an outlier from what are largely universally accepted international agreements: Bolton saw the latter “as an important victory against global governance,” an apt reflection of his world view. His antipathy for multilateral diplomacy runs deep: “I urged that we withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council”; “I also advocated defunding the UN Relief Works Agency [sic]”; “Trump, for example, readily agreed to un-sign the Obama-era Arms Trade Treaty”; “When I resigned, consideration was under way regarding leaving Open Skies, and press reports indicated that these efforts, which I still fully support, were continuing.” US reputational decline as a result of such disparagement of international cooperation has been incalculable. Fourth, Bolton reveals himself to be a serial backstabber: he repeatedly excoriates his administration colleagues, most notably Secretary of Defense General James Mattis (“I soon realized Mattis was our biggest problem”), just as he does Trump. More broadly, in his narrative of his time as NSA, and of his views on and contribution to US foreign policy, Bolton paints a stark picture of himself: someone who is all-knowing, with absolute certainty that his views and assessments are accurate and that anyone who disagrees with him is uninformed, ignorant, or worse; someone who views toppling regimes and assassinating leaders of countries whose policies he opposes as normal, acceptable aspects of foreign policy; and someone who disdains an international order based on the rule of law. Bolton repeatedly combines a polemical presentation of his policy views with unsubstantiated criticism and inaccurate descriptions of policies with which he disagrees. In my view, there is much to be criticized about the US approach to the Middle East in recent decades, and all recent presidents deserve to be called out for their policy failures in the region. Most prominent among these are George W. Bush's failure to act against the al-Qaeda threat in August-September 2001 and his disastrous decision to invade Iraq in April 2003. Obama can rightly be faulted for his poor handling of US policy toward the Syrian civil war. And all modern presidents can be criticized for failing to put US interests ahead of those of Israel in response to Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territories. But Trump, and enablers such as Bolton, have wrought more damage to US goals and interests in the Middle East than all post-World War II presidents combined. “I warned Trump against wasting political capital in an elusive search to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute and strongly supported moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, thereby recognizing it as Israel's capital.” The above quote notwithstanding, Bolton does give lip service to the value to the United States of a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In discussing the converging interests between the Arab Gulf states and Israel in prioritizing the effort to counter malign Iranian regional behavior and threats, Bolton notes, “This Iran consensus was also contemporaneously making possible a new push to resolve the Israel-Palestine dispute, which strategically could very much benefit America.” Over more than seven decades following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, 12 presidential administrations (six Republican, six Democratic) followed policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian dispute that, while always skewed somewhat in Israel's favor, did not cross any red lines protecting US values and interests. That changed with Trump. In The Room Where It Happened, Bolton asserts, without explanation, justification, or context, the correctness of Trump's reversal of many decades of bipartisan US policies, including moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, closing the Palestinian representation office in Washington, canceling funding for Palestinian refugees and humanitarian projects in the Palestinian territories, and recognizing Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, among others. These policy reversals were based entirely on Trump's personal political considerations. Neither US interests, nor principles or values—morality, fairness, justice—played any role. Trump's calculation was twofold: to secure the political and financial backing of US megadonors who support right-wing Israeli policies; and to secure the support of US Christian evangelicals who view the establishment of the State of Israel as the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy and Israel's existence as part of an End Times narrative. In fact, Trump dealt with Israel-Palestine just as he did with every other issue: pursue policies of direct political benefit to himself, regardless of their harm to US interests; divide Americans into “us” vs. “them” camps; and have no qualms about betraying fundamental American principles or even adherence to the rule of law while doing so. During my several decades as a US diplomat in the Middle East, it was clear that the most devastating factor affecting the attitude of Arabs toward the United States has been the decades-long US support for—or at least acquiescence in—Israeli intransigency toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. This included Israel's settlement building and annexation, and its treatment of the Palestinians under its military occupation. Since the appearance of Bolton's book, we have seen the emergence of an agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) linking the pursuit of normal relations with Israel's forgoing unilateral annexation of territory in the West Bank. I, like many, welcomed this diplomatic breakthrough. I believe it prevented the potential devastation that unilateral Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank would have wrought—politically, in terms of achieving an equitable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and, in humanitarian terms, by forestalling a deterioration in the security environment that unilateral Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank would trigger. However, it is important to understand the backstory here. The impetus for the UAE's offer of normalized relations with Israel was the Trump administration's announced willingness to violate the UN Charter and international law, something the Trump administration had already done in 2019 by formally recognizing Israeli annexation of Syria's Golan Heights, captured by Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War. No country other than the United States recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights; the UN Charter forbids the annexation of territory taken by force. In January 2020, the Trump administration unveiled an Arab-Israeli peace plan that countenanced US recognition of Israeli annexation of up to 30 percent of the West Bank. Thus, the Trump administration, for a second time, put itself on record in violation of the UN Charter and international law. Put simply, its brokering of the normalization agreement between Israel and the UAE was an act of extortion. And the pattern continued into the final months of the Trump administration with both Sudan and Morocco—holding Sudan hostage to being listed as a global sponsor of terrorism, and bribing Morocco by recognizing its sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara—in order to cajole these two nations into normalizing relations with Israel. “[T]he 2015 and and entirely to and in and with his of Trump's policies on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bolton's concerning the Iran are and, in fact, from on the of his Iran Bolton reveals his contempt for the very of state his of the international order that into existence in Bolton the to on Iran on the of several Iranian policies or including and its as the for and its military the Middle most of the I would that all are But one is an in to the international including to the United possible pursuit of a for the and the global that threat was by a agreement with and and by the UN the of the Iran in Bolton to this Bolton's disparagement of Mattis in the and that led to Trump's of the Iran is During my time as the US in Mattis was of US I had the on several to him in concerning with military with my US to the Gulf states in at regional at the in It was clear to that Mattis was a on Iran and in his on policy Bolton the quote from and the of the of one of his book's It is not Bolton, however, who what the quote Bolton Mattis adherence to the as a of Iranian in the there to Bolton, some the Trump administration of to a Bolton his position “I our policy with Iran terrorism, military could not be and we particularly could not from all its other malign This was on the Bolton would be no Iran and no as long as In Bolton, we in this a to a world in which Iran is to pursue a or we steps to in which would almost military and a regional war. 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The Iranian that Obama had relations with the Iranian an approach that the Iranian supported and their government to It was a diplomatic effort by the Obama administration to use the of status and among in support of relations with the United States and the West to to aspects of Iranian regional as Bolton that the United States of through the to Iran to its malign regional behavior is of Bolton's a Trump about “the by John and the Obama and cites “the on to Iran under He to mention that the was to He also the of such to put on the Iranian to the of the Iranian to mention that the of these was an of successfully the Iranian to this the Iranian through and in into its foreign at the of the of the Iranian And the Trump administration's policy of the of It did not about or a in Iranian support for malign such as in the in in or the in It however, have three to US interests. It Iran to up its it the Iranian with their government in to the United and it from its in the Iranian troubling also was the January 2020, that a Trump administration that took Bolton's time in government one he had advocated for and In his book, Bolton supports the of on does not the of However, at the time of Bolton did that was long in the reports that, following the Iranian of a US in Bolton's as like Secretary of State and security adviser John Bolton the to out the Iranian in The decision to was in many The for this and that it to But the damage and went much than Trump's decision to such a and as with all of Trump's decisions, based entirely on his that it would be to his political The that it international law and universally and that it a that would all US military and other government the was of no to him to The use of a to a Iranian military from a country with which the United States was not at who was from a into a based on the that the United States to Iranian government policies that was involved in a to a It the of any government by any government that to the policies that is and policies the of political like Trump international that the rule of law, and American diplomatic capital and through decades of US in order to pursue their leaving the to their be long from the of Trump and I on almost and I even there we that of American in led to the we have In The Room Where It Happened, Bolton displays a for In the above the part refers to the that Bolton was an of the Iraq while Trump has that he The second part is It was George W. and his such as not Obama who to the we have I had the to serve as the secretary for Iraq in the of in the of State in and the transition from the to the Obama administration took The US approach to Iraq did not during that the of the two important agreements were by the United States and a of and a were by US to Iraq on and both went into on January just Obama the The that all US combat would Iraq by The and US with Iraq for the long this the and into under the administration into which the was the and between the US and the time the between the United States and Iraq was there was no that was under from which to all foreign from the territory of its Arab But there was also from the the very including the and for US to the It was a decision by a government that in the of all US combat by the of Bolton's other concerning Trump and Iraq Trump's that the United States in countries into which it In his of the of an on several the of on and the possible US Bolton the Gulf Arabs to the of we were that we have taken in it the most effective narrative by our concerning the of Iraq while I was the diplomacy office at the US embassy in in and was that the of the in fact, to decision withdraw US from the in was a for US policy and for our The strongly bipartisan political Trump was entirely and entirely The one Middle foreign-policy in which Bolton to have in a that supported US national interests this by US policy toward and the In The Room Where It Happened, Bolton the disastrous of the Trump on 2018, with in which a and Trump to withdraw US from in being by the US in to those over to security does the reader a service by from years he was the of is like a it to the and This of into those for what would have been a of the the United States had to out of its in was Bolton Trump's with foreign and his for US in on the both to the against and to Iranian and with on the most of the the threat itself was from the picture was In a narrative with gratuitous against Obama and several of his Trump administration colleagues, Bolton the reader through an of the and interests at in the on the US and policy in His account it clear that he could Trump through and to him in to where he had to he his all US from and as many US as In this however, Bolton, and in the administration prevented Trump's from all that the United States and its had in those with the of this story are to Trump to withdraw and the of over to continued in Trump the US to The military did its to US interests there by in Iraq that could be in the damage was this period the of through and Trump supported the emerging and never from both the or the already with the Bolton's account Trump's approach to US foreign policy was more than in his with the Gulf as his foreign as to his of of particularly by out to be to his on the Gulf the and on one and on the to his to him out of a Trump that the Gulf was where the Bolton's narrative reveals that Trump never the value of the from the to the global and to that the United States one of the of the of from the Trump on from the Middle East for and This led to his in Bolton's these countries and and Middle East more to their Bolton notes that, as Trump US policy in the he was on the Gulf Arab states for we to It has been in the Middle East in and in the Gulf in that Trump's of fundamental US values and principles has done the most His that the United States would what had been red lines that behavior by any country that to a US I from my decades as a US diplomat in the while the of the Middle East have largely US policies in the support for Israel being the prior to the Trump administration there was widespread for the values the United States as a and for the those values had on their This during the Trump administration, more than in the of and the of in No of a US country in the would have such under any prior US of The Room Where It be while at the time by Bolton's narrative of Donald Trump and his The reader also of the and of a of American who have their principles and its reputation, and Trump and his to harm of on the United I that those who believe in and in the values that the into our and the country from the and among I pleased that these Americans have taken the toward doing by the that the American put Trump in of the country never be by our always have to their with the United be our country always act on principles and interests or and support the values that had our something had not had to over the post-World War II to the this harm to America's and decline in its international be the of Donald Trump and his such as John

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