Are We Justified in Conducting Invasive Research on Captive Apes for Their Wild Counterparts

Bibliographic Data

ID12418451
AuthorsKatlin Kraska (Independent researcher, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume26
Issue6
Pages598-615
Publication date2018-12-07
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueSociety and Animals (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1063-1119 • E-ISSN: 1568-5306
PublisherBrill (PUBLISHER • NL)
DOI10.1163/15685306-12341575
OpenAlexW2924420321
LanguageEN
References cited8

Wildlife species are threatened for a variety of reasons; research on captive individuals of the same species can, in some circumstances, prevent wild population decline. Such decisions pit conservationists and animal rights advocates against one another—the former are interested in survival of the species and the latter in individual rights. I argue that invasive research on captive animals for the sake of wild animals is justifiable in cases of emergency only if it is the lesser of two evils. This requires that the individual chimpanzee be compensated for harms incurred. I then argue this logic generally does not apply to human beneficiaries of invasive research conducted on chimpanzees. This is not because species membership is morally significant, but because asymmetrical power relations characterized by dependency and vulnerability will always exist between the groups if human interests are at stake. The argument focuses on federal chimpanzee conservation policy

Animal ethics · Argument (complex analysis · Biology · Computer security · Criminology · Environmental ethics · Non-human · Political science · Population · Power (physics · Sociology · Threatened species · Variety (cybernetics · Vulnerability (computing · Wildlife · Wildlife conservation · Demography · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Zoonotic diseases and public health · Ecology

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