Liberalism, Populism, and Collective Choice

Bibliographic Data

ID12419465
AuthorsBenjamin Radcliff (University of Notre Dame, corresponding author)
Year1993
Volume46
Issue1
Pages127-142
Publication date1993-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/106591299304600109
OpenAlexW2084106566
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited20

This paper examines how the problem of cyclical majorities affects the logical structure of the liberal model of democracy. I argue that Riker's (1982) defense of liberalism is unsatisfying in that it ultimately depends upon the hope that cycles are not common events. As an alternative solution, I propose that the assumptions of a properly construed liberal model imply conditions that prohibit the occurrence of the voter's paradox. I conclude that liberalism continues to survive despite the fact that its internal structure depends upon the transitivity of collective preferences, and that this fact in turn provides a theoretical foundation for pursuing more robust or "populistic" conceptions of democracy

Classical liberalism · Collective action · Democracy · Economics · Foundation (evidence · Law and economics · Liberalism · Majority rule · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Politics · Populism · Positive economics · Transitive relation · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Law · Mathematics · Political Economy and Marxism · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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