Does Local Autonomy Breed Leviathans? An Empirical Examination of All Cities in the United States
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12419981 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mikhail Ivonchyk (0000-0001-9838-8549, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, NY, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1079-1095 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-10 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Research Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/10659129211049817 |
| OpenAlex | W3206231548 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 54 |
US states grant their local units different levels of autonomy in several dimensions including fiscal, functional, structural, and legal discretion. This study uses a comprehensive, multidimensional measure of autonomy to test its association with the fiscal behavior of over 19,000 municipalities in the United States. Competing theoretical predictions range from significant increases in government size (Leviathan model), to no effect (median-voter model), and even smaller governments (institutional collective action model). Quantile regression analysis is implemented to test the association between autonomy and fiscal behavior for different city sizes. The empirical findings indicate that cities with more autonomy tend to spend less and have lower taxes and debt. The strength of this relationship, however, varies by city size
Autonomy · Demographic economics · Discretion · Econometrics · Economics · Government (linguistics · Local government · Political science · Public economics · Quantile regression · Test (biology · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
Race and Public Administration
Quantile Regression
Governing the Commons
Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure
The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources
Tax and Expenditure Limitations
The Theory of Committees and Elections
The Politics of Sin
What Have We Learned about the Performance of Council‐Manager Government? A Review and Synthesis of the Research
Creating an index of local autonomy – theoretical, conceptual, and empirical issues
Rational Choice and Regional Governance
Understanding the Consequences of Municipal Discretion
When Collaboration Is Risky Business
On the Determinants of School District Efficiency
Interjurisdictional Competition and Local Public Finance
Competitors and Cooperators
Core–Peripheral Structure and Regional Governance
Institutional Collective Action and Economic Development Joint Ventures
Corruption and State and Local Government Debt Expansion
An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy
The Impact of Public Officials’ Corruption on the Size and Allocation of U.S. State Spending
Approaches to Social Research
Taming the Local Leviathan
Nested Levels of Institutions
State Centralization and the Erosion of Local Autonomy
Dillon’s Rule is From Mars, Home Rule is From Venus
State-Local Relations
The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local Public Sector
The Institutional Collective Action Framework
Performance Management, Managerial Authority, and Public Service Performance
When Ties Bind
Devolution, Fiscal Federalism, and Changing Patterns of Municipal Revenues
Testing How Management Matters in an Era of Government by Performance Management
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |