Economic Development and the Implementation of Village Elections in Rural China

Bibliographic Data

ID12422764
AuthorsRong Hu (0000-0002-4312-9248), R Weixing Hu (corresponding author)
Year2005
Volume14
Issue44
Pages427-444
Publication date2005-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Contemporary China (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1067-0564 • E-ISSN: 1469-9400
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10670560500115234
OpenAlexW1986694580
LanguageEN
Citations received21

Based on survey data from rural Fujian Province of China, this paper shows that economic development, especially village collective revenue, plays an important role in village elections. With economic development and industrialization, collective revenues will increase and differentiated interests will develop among villagers. Village elections are institutional channels for villagers to articulate their interests. The research findings show that it is the collective revenue and the relative living standard of the village compared with other townships within the same county or district that arouse villagers' interests for participation and candidates' motives for campaigning, and thus enhance the implementation of elections. The paper concludes that village-level economic development is crucial for the implementation of competitive elections. With economic development, village committees will control more collective revenues, thus increasing the stakes villagers have in elections. This will result in greater participation by villagers in elections, and in more competitive elections. Increased competitiveness of elections will facilitate changes in the institutions regarding village committee elections. Notes Rong Hu is professor of sociology at Xiamen University, China. He served as a visiting scholar at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign from January to July 2003. He is the author of Rational Choice and Institutional Implementation: Case Studies of Village Elections in Rural China (Shanghai: Far East Press, 2001). His current research focuses on rural politics in mainland China. The author would like to thank Lianjiang Li, Lily Tsai, Victoria Hui, John Kennedy and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article. Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy', American Political Science Review 53, (March 1959), p. 75. For a more recent review of the thesis, see Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, 'Comparative democracy: the economic development thesis', American Political Science Review 88(4), (December 1994), pp. 903–910; Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, 'Modernization: theories and facts', World Politics 49(2), (1997), pp. 155–183; Edward N. Muller, 'Economic determinants of democracy', American Sociological Review 60, (December 1995), pp. 966–982; John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, 'Does high income promote democracy?', World Politics 49, (October 1996), pp. 1–30. Jean Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). According to John Burns, peasants under the Commune System in Mao Era were mobilized to participate in politics aiming at implementing state policies. Rong Hu discusses villagers' political participation in village elections and insists that peasants' political participation has transformed from mobilized participation to autonomous participation. Johns Burns, Political Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Rong Hu, 'Cunmin Weiyunhui Xuanju Zhong Cunmin De Zizhu Shi Changyu' ['The autonomous participation of villagers in village elections'], in Lianjiang Li, ed., Cunweihui Xuanju Guangcha [Observations of Village Elections] (Tianjing Renming Chubangshe, 2001). Rong Hu, 'Cunming weiyunhui de zizhi jiqi yu xiangzhen zhengfu de guangxi' ['The autonomy of village committees and their relationships with township government', Er Shi Yi Shiji [The 21st Century] 50, (December 1998). Interview, May 1997. For the classic discussion of election cost, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1957). See Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Yianjie Bian, Work and Inequality in Urban China (Albany: State University of New York, 1994). For a discussion of the Residents' Committees, see Benjamin L. Read, 'Revitalizing the state's urban "nerve tips"', The China Quarterly no. 163, (September 2000), pp. 806–820. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China. According to the Rong Hu, four important factors contribute to villager participation in elections: (1) incumbent village leaders' behavior: if leaders abuse their power during office terms, more villagers will participate in elections to vote against the incumbents; (2) election fairness: the fairer the election, the more efficacious villagers feel, and the more they participate in elections; (3) economic development: economic development will increase the competitiveness of elections; and (4) characteristics of local communities, which decrease the anonymity of voters, also contribute to high turnout under some occasions. Rong Hu, 'Cunmin Weiyunhui Xuanju Zhong Cunmin De Zizhu Shi Changyu'. According to Kevin O'Brien, in more developed villages, where many cadres broker semi-marketized relationships and sometimes operate highly profitable enterprises themselves, cadre spirit and energy are generally higher. See Kevin O'Brien, 'Implementing political reform in China's villages', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32, (1994), pp. 33–59. Some village collective wealth comes from collective enterprises, some from compensation from the state for land confiscation, others from fees collected from villagers. See, e.g. Tyrene Whyte, 'Reforming the countryside', Current History no. 91, (1992), pp. 273–277; Susan V. Lawrence, 'Democracy, Chinese style', The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs no. 32, (1994), pp. 59–68; O'Brien, 'Implementing political reform in China's villages'; John Dearlove, 'Village politics', in Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, eds, China in the 1990s (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), pp. 120–131; Melanie Manion, 'The electoral connection in the Chinese countryside', American Political Science Review 90(4), (1996), pp. 736–748; Jean Oi, 'Economic development, stability and democratic village self-governance', in Maurice Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper and Tsang Shu-ki, eds, China Review 1996 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996), pp. 125–144; Daniel Kelliher, 'The Chinese debate over village self-government', The China Journal 37, (1997), pp. 63–86; Tianjian Shi, 'Economic development and village elections', Journal of Contemporary China 8(22), (November 1999), pp. 425–442; Jean Oi and Scott Rozelle, 'Elections and power: the locus of decision making in Chinese villages', The China Quarterly 162, (June 2000), pp. 513–539; Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, 'Accommodating "democracy" in a one-party state: introducing village elections in China', The China Quarterly 162, (June 2000), pp. 465–489; Robert A. Pastor and Qingshan Tan, 'The meaning of China's village elections', The China Quarterly 162, (June 2000), pp. 490–512. Lawrence, 'Democracy, Chinese style'. O'Brien, 'Implementing political reform in China's villages'. Oi, 'Economic development, stability and democratic village self-governance'. Army Epstein, 'Village elections in China: experimenting with democracy', in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, China's Economic Future (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). Shi, 'Economic development and village elections'. Shi, 'Economic development and village elections'..; Oi and Rozelle, 'Elections and power'. Wang Zhengyiao and Tang Jingsu, Zhongguo Nongcun Cunmin Daibiao Huiyi Zhidu [Villager Representative Assembly System in Rural China] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe, 1995). About the origin and development of village elections, see O'Brien and Li, 'Accommodating "democracy" in a one-party state'. See Kelliher, 'The Chinese debate over village self-government'; O'Brien and Li, 'Accommodating "democracy" in a one-party state'. Interview, December 2000. Nanfang Ribao [South Daily], (15 January 2002). Shi, 'Economic development and village elections'; Oi and Rozelle, 'Elections and power'. It might be interesting to explore how provincial institutions have been set up and why the Organic Law was implemented differently among provinces. But this is not the focus of this paper. We take institutions as a given in this study. Shi, 'Economic development and village elections'; Oi and Rozelle, 'Elections and power'. John Kennedy stresses the importance of nomination in village elections. See John Kennedy, 'The face of "grassroots democracy" in rural China', Asian Survey XLII(3), (May/June 2003), pp. 456–482. See Jorgen Elklit, 'The Chinese village committee electoral system', China Information 11(4), (1997), pp. 1–13; Anne F. Thurston, 'Muddling toward democracy: political change in grassroots China', Peaceworks no. 23, (1998), United States Institute of Peace; Pastor and Tan, 'The meaning of China's village elections'; O'Brien and Li, 'Accommodating "democracy" in a one-party state'. Shi, 'Economic development and village elections'; Oi and Rozelle, 'Elections and power'. We also calculate a percentage of in-migration in every village, which is not included in the models for its co-linearity with collective revenue (with a correlation coefficient of 0.561). However, some villages in poor areas may get a big sum of appropriation from higher government during some period. For example, Weishan village, a poor village in Xiqi township of Shouning county got 1,000,000 yuan appropriation from county government to build a road in 1997, which made the village election highly competitive. Interview, May 1997. Interview, October 2001. According to Kevin O'Brien, wealth and a flourishing collective economy may ease completion of state tasks, raise cadres subsidies, and soften villagers' resistance to state duties. I fully agree with O'Brien's argument. However, I don't think higher collective income will reduce incumbent's fear of electoral defeat. Although considerable research suggests that higher education can make people more involved in politics, Shi finds that citizen education is only weakly correlated with political efficacy, weakly supports political change, and negatively influences support for economic reform. See Lipset, 'Some social requisites of democracy'; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Civil Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Norman H. Nie, Bingham G. Powell Jr and Kenneth Prewitt, 'Social structure and political participation: developmental relationships, part I', American Political Science Review 63(2), (June 1969), pp. 361–378; Norman H. Nie, Bingham G. Powell Jr and Kenneth Prewitt, 'Social structure and political participation: developmental relationships, part II', American Political Science Review 63(3), (September 1969), pp. 808–832; Tianjian Shi, 'Cultural values and democracy in the People's Republic of China', The China Quarterly 162, (June 2000), pp. 540–559. For example, Mingxin Pei suggests that grassroots elections may be part of China's 'creeping democratization' and Sylvia Chan argues that villager's self-government may become a growth point for civil society. See Minxin Pei, 'Creeping democratization in China', Journal of Democracy 6(4), (October 1995), pp. 65–79; Sylvia Chan, 'Research notes on villagers' committee election: Chinese style democracy', Journal of Contemporary China 7(19), (1998), pp. 507–521. Additional informationNotes on contributorsRong Hu Footnote* Rong Hu is professor of sociology at Xiamen University, China. He served as a visiting scholar at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign from January to July 2003. He is the author of Rational Choice and Institutional Implementation: Case Studies of Village Elections in Rural China (Shanghai: Far East Press, 2001). His current research focuses on rural politics in mainland China. The author would like to thank Lianjiang Li, Lily Tsai, Victoria Hui, John Kennedy and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article

China · Economic growth · Economics · Industrialisation · Mainland China · Political science · Politics · Revenue · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Chinese history and philosophy · Law · Public Administration

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