Organizing for Effective Environmental Cooperation

ffective environmental protection requires both formulation of rules and policy commitments that encourage behavior improving envi JL?^ronmental quality and implementation of what is agreed. Either by itself will not suffice: complete implementation of poorly conceived rules and policies yields little or no environmental benefit, while fitful action vitiates the effect of well-formulated directives. Thus, securing effective environmental protection requires development of institutional mecha nisms to identify weaknesses in implementation by encouraging better ef forts, reviewing how well the rules and policy commitments are actually serving the overall goal of environmental protection, and revising to im prove them. The international conditions?both systemwide and sectoral or issue specific?that affect the success of international cooperation and the shape of intergovernmental organizations have been the subject of a growing body of scholarly literature. The continuing decentralization of governance in the international system, best symbolized in the principle of state sovereignty, establishes the need for cooperation. The ecological, infor mational, and economic interconnections among states create incentives for cooperation. And the strong deference accorded to scientific modes of reasoning in comprehending environmental problems provides a common language for discussing them.1 The ease of obtaining cooperation and the exact form it takes depend heavily on sectoral or issue-specific conditions?the nature of the cooper ation required (in particular, coordination or collaboration); the shape of the distributions of gains and losses accruing to individual actors involved in the cooperative effort; the number and types of actors involved; the available information about preferences, behavior, and relevant world con ditions; and the relative rate of change in world conditions. All these con ditions influence when cooperation will be attempted and what institu tional forms will be adopted to help maintain it.2 Several experienced policymakers and scholarly observers have advo cated creating a single global environmental organization to address every environmental issue through all phases of the policy process.3 Their pro posals have not yet won broad support, however. Several factors account for

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• Diplomacy and domestic politics

  Open Access•Robert D Putnam•International Organization•1988

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