Peirce, Mead, and the Objectivity of Meaning
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12463699 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J D Lewis (0000-0001-5277-5922, University of Illinois System, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1972 |
| Publication date | 1972-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Social Thought and Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1094-5830 • E-ISSN: 2469-8466 |
| Publisher | The University of Kansas (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.17161/str.1808.4766 |
| OpenAlex | W2088219174 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 3 |
This paper shows parallelisms between the philosophies of George H. Mead and Charles S. Peirce. Because they both view cognition from the social realist's perspective, they independently developed equivalent triadic theories of meaning. It is further argued that their pragmatic account of meaning logically leads to belief in the objectivity and communality of truth and scientific knowledge. This reveals their opposition to the nominalistic and individualistic view of truth and knowledge sometimes embraced in contemporary sociology of knowledge
Epistemology · Meaning (existential · Objectivity (philosophy · Philosophy · Political Economy and Marxism
| Citations per year | 0.04 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1981 - 2024 (44) |
| Highly cited | No |