A Shared Negation, Opposed Closures
Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and Madhyamaka Buddhism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12497807 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cosimo Pastia (0009-0004-8578-113X, University of Ferrara, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 152-167 |
| Publication date | 2025-12-29 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Human Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1210-3055 • E-ISSN: 1337-401X |
| Publisher | De Gruyter (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/humaff-2024-0135 |
| OpenAlex | W7117458902 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 6 |
This essay examines whether a shared anti-substantialist gesture yields comparable final commitments in Nietzsche and Madhyamaka Buddhism (prāsaṅgika reading). Both reject substantialist ontology and the presumed transparency of concepts; yet their trajectories diverge at the point of closure. Madhyamaka withholds any ultimate posit at the level of ultimate truth, returning normativity to the conventional domain; Nietzsche turns critique into an affirmative practice structured by will to power and the existential test of eternal recurrence. To diagnose – not to conflate – this divergence, the paper stages two controlled reconstructions: Nishitani to model ultimate-level suspension ( śūnyatā ) and Severino to model immanent necessity (recurrence). The analysis shows that a shared negation does not secure a shared “last step,” but issues in opposed closures. The two “stress-tests” – Nishitani’s suspension and Severino’s immanent necessity – serve only to sharpen the picture: they make the distance between Nietzsche’s affirmation and Madhyamaka’s suspension unmistakable
Buddhism · Conflation · Existentialism · Negation · Ontology · Transparency (behavior · Indian and Buddhist Studies · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophical Ethics and Theory
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |