Israel's Nuclear Option Revisited
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12534735 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Zaki Shalom (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 267-277 |
| Publication date | 2005-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Israeli History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1353-1042 • E-ISSN: 1744-0548 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13531040500249112 |
| OpenAlex | W1967044133 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 5 |
Israel began developing its nuclear option in the early 1950s because of its fear of the Arab world's hostile intentions. The country's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion Aronson, Shlomo. 2000. David Ben-Gurion: Manhig ha-renesans she-shaka, Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion Heritage Institute. (David Ben-Gurion: The renaissance leader and the waning of an age) [Google Scholar], believed that the Arab world, despite its internal rifts, was united on one subject: the destruction of Israel as an independent Jewish state. Notwithstanding Israel's impressive victory in the 1948 war, Ben-Gurion was convinced that the Arabs were capable of realizing this goal. He regarded the nuclear option as the only means that could deter them from endangering Israel's survival. At a certain stage in the mid-1960s, Israel's nuclear option became a factor with far-reaching strategic implications, and Israel adopted a policy of ambiguity in this regard. Despite the dramatic changes in the balance of power between Israel and the Arab world and Israel's relations with the Great Powers, this policy still seems relevant and best suited to Israel's national interests
Ancient history · Economic history · Political science · Politics · Prime minister · State (computer science · Victory · History · Law · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts · Nuclear Issues and Defense
| Citations per year | 0.06 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2010 - 2010 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |