Participation in Peace Support Operations for Small Countries

The Case of Norway

Bibliographic Data

ID12537325
AuthorsTorunn Laugen Haaland (0000-0003-2950-8388, corresponding author)
Year2007
Volume14
Issue4
Pages493-509
Publication date2007-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Peacekeeping (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1353-3312 • E-ISSN: 1743-906X
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13533310701427777
OpenAlexW1998465725
LanguageEN
Citations received4

Norway's growing participation in international missions has challenged both civilian and military perceptions of the ideal role of the Norwegian military. The armed forces' overall purpose has gone from homeland defence to being a security policy instrument. At the same time, the traditional humanitarian profile of Norway's foreign deployments has been replaced by a more distinct military role. Although politically initiated, the restructuring of the Norwegian armed forces has political implications that may be difficult to accept. A defence structure adapted to high-intensity operations abroad entails new political choices, but for small countries, such as Norway, political choices are also constricted as a result of closer integration with multinational force structures. Furthermore, a much smaller structure combined with high international ambitions places a heavy strain on military personnel and their families. Thus far, political and military leaders in Norway have largely agreed on the overall direction of military reforms. However, military authorities have signalled that ample budgets are required, along with further geographical concentration of forces in Norway and a continued commitment to international force integration. All these measures come at a high political cost. Keywords: United Nationspeacekeepingpeace support operationsdefence reformcivil-military relationsNorway ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Eli Stamnes, Kåre Dahl Martinsen and Mandy Turner for their comments. Notes 1. In Norway's case the change was mainly quantitative until the late 1990s, but has been mainly qualitative since then. The number of troops deployed abroad in 2006 was smaller than the equivalent number in 1990 and less than one-third of the number deployed abroad in the mid-1990s. 2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1957, p.2. 3. One important clarification should be made about terminology. The term ‘peace support operation’ does not have a well-established definition. It is often used as a common phrase for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, or as a synonym for so-called ‘operations-other-than-war’. Many military operations do not fit neatly into these categories. One operation may for instance go from peacekeeping to enforcement and back again due to changing circumstances in the field. Furthermore, the distinction between peace enforcement and war will to some extent also lie in the eye of the beholder. Whereas some called NATO's operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 ‘peace enforcement’, others would undoubtedly call it an aggressive act of war. This article focuses on the consequences increased participation in international military operations have for the armed forces of small countries, and will not distinguish between peace support operations and warlike operations. Instead I use the term ‘international military operations’, which includes both. 4. Huntington (see n.2 above); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait, New York: The Free Press, 1971. 5. Ibid., pp.424–5. 6. Forvarets fellesoperative doktrine [The Armed Forces' Joint Operative Doctrine], Oslo: Headquarters Defence Command, 2000. 7. Report to the Storting No.14 (1992–93), Beredskap for fred. Norges framtidige militære FN-engasjement og FNs rolle som konfliktløser [Readiness for peace. Norway's future UN engagement and the UN's role in solving conflicts], Oslo: Ministry of Defence, 1993, p.37. 8. The notable exception was Opération Des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) in Congo, which began in 1960. 9. Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth and Rolf Tamnes, Allianseforsvar i endring [Allied Defence in transition], Bergen: Eide Forlag, 2004, pp.177–82. 10. Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Aktuelle forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer’ [Present defence and security challenges], Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, No.2, 1991. 11. Ibid. 12. Torolf Rein, ‘Norges forsvar i 1990-årene’ [Norway's armed forces in the 1990s], Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, No.11, 1990. 13. Jarle Aabø, ‘“Andenes” opererte som et krigsskip' [‘Andenes’ operated as warship], Dagens næringsliv (Oslo), 23 April 1991; Bård Idås and John Harbo, ‘Får ikke flytte feltsykehus’ [Not allowed to move field hospital], Aftenposten (Oslo), 28 Feb. 1991. 14. Terje Myklevoll, ‘Luksus-krigere. “Opererer føflekker og klager på lønna”’[Luxury warriors. ‘Have surgery on moles and complain about wages’], Dagbladet (Oslo), 1 Mar. 1991. 15. Smaller units were a movement control team, military observers who were dispersed throughout Former Yugoslavia, and infantry who were part of a Nordic battalion in Macedonia. The Air Force and Navy also participated in NATO's embargo operation in the Adriatic and in UN transport operations. 16. Kjell Grandhagen, ‘Med IFOR til Bosnia-Herzegovina. Erfaringer fra den nordisk–polske brigaden’ [With IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Experiences from the Nordic–Polish Brigade], Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, No.2, 1997. 17. Legal experts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that previous Security Council resolutions and statements made by the president of the Security Council provided a sufficient legal mandate for the operation. 18. The Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, insisted that Operation Allied Force was not a war, but a military operation (but changed his mind four years later). The leader of the same party (Christian Democrats) said that she supported the operation, but added that she did not like bombs. 19. Gudmund Løvø, ‘Rustes opp til stridsevne i mørke’ [Upgrades to combat ability in the dark], Aftenposten, 23 Jan. 1999. 20. The decision to participate was taken on 11 June 1999, and the entire battalion was deployed on 6 October. Robert Mood, ‘Erfaringer fra KFOR I’ [Experiences from KFOR I], Norsk militært tidsskrift, no.6/7, 2000. 21. UN Security Council Resolutions 1483, 22 May 2003 and 1511, 16 Oct. 2003. Norwegian authorities chose not to participate in the first part of the war, arguably because it was not authorized by the UN Security Council. 22. Matthew Brzezinski, ‘Who's Afraid of Norway?’, The New York Times, 24 Aug. 2003. 23. Report to the Storting No.22 (1997–98), Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet og utvikling i tiden 1999–2002 [Principal Guidelines for the Development and Activities of the Armed Forces for the period 1999–2002], Oslo: Ministry of Defence, 1998. 24. Forsvarsanalysen 2000 [Defence analysis 2000], Headquarters Defence Command, Oslo, 2000; Royal Proposition No.42 (2003–2004), Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008 [The further modernization of the armed forces in the period 2005–2008], Oslo: Ministry of Defence, Oslo, 2004. 25. See for instance Kåre Granå, Hærens sanitet 1880–2002 [The Army's Medical Corps 1880–2002], Oslo: Infomediahuset, 2004, p. 314. 26. The Air Defence and the Navy were also to take part in NATO's IRF structure, but I focus on the Army's development of such capacities which remained problematic throughout the rest of the period. Royal proposition No.83 (1992–93), Om visse organisasjonsendringer mv i Forsvaret. [On certain organisational changes of the armed forces], Oslo: Ministry of Defence, 1993). 27. Arne Druglimo, ‘En bataljonssjefs tanker om IRF-bataljonen’ [A battalion commander's thoughts on the IRF battalion], Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, No.1, 1994. 28. Report to the Storting No.38 (1998–99), Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltakelse i internasjonale operasjoner [Adapting the armed forces to participation in international operations], Oslo: Ministry of Defence, 1999. 29. Some of these goals were already formulated in the latest long-term plan for Norwegian defence, but practical solutions for their implications were not proposed until 1999. 30. Forsvarsstudien 2000 [Defence Study 2000], Oslo: Headquarters Defence Command, 2000. 31. Norwegian Public Report No.20, Et nytt forsvar [New armed forces], Oslo: Statens forvaltningstjeneste, 2000. 32. Royal proposition No.45 (2000–2001), Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005 [Reform of the armed forces in 2002–2005], Oslo: Ministry of Defence, 2001. 33. Other important measures, not discussed here, included reform of the command structure. 34. Forsvarssjefens militærfaglige utredning 2003 [The Chief of Defence's military report 2003], Oslo: Headquarters Defence Command, 2003, p.2. 35. Report to the Storting No.14 (1992–1993), Beredskap for fred. Norges framtidige militære FN-engasjement og FNs rolle som konfliktløser [Readiness for peace. Norway's future UN engagement and the UN's role in solving international conflicts], Oslo: Ministry of Defence, 1993. 36. Ibid. 37. Christopher Dandeker and James Gow, ‘Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping’, in Erwin Schmidl, Peace Operations between War and Peace, London: Frank Cass, 2000, p.60. 38. One infantry battalion will be fully integrated in the German–Netherlands Corps. The air force will continue co-operation with Denmark and the Netherlands, and the navy will continue its participation in NATO's standing naval forces in the Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). 39. Sverre Diesen, ‘Mot et allianseintegrert forsvar’ [Towards an alliance integrated defence] in Janne Haaland Matlary and Øyvind Østerud (eds), Mot et avnasjonalisert forsvar [Towards denationalised armed forces], Oslo: Abstrakt forlag, 2005, p.164. 40. The Norwegian government turned down NATO's request for special forces in October 2006, but when the request was repeated in February 2007, Norway concurred. 41. ‘Stortinget krever innsyn i våpenlånet til USA’ [The Storting demands access to the weapons loan to the United States], NTB (Norwegian News Agency), 26 Oct. 2004. 42. Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, interviewed before Norwegian fighter planes went to Afghanistan, said that his deepest concern was that they would take part in operations that would accidentally kill Afghan civilians. Even though the concern was understandable, military personnel reacted adversely to the fact that he did not mention any concern for the safety of the Norwegian troops that were about to be deployed. 43. ‘Farlig forvirring’ [Dangerous confusion], Dagbladet, 12 Dec. 2003; ‘Forsvarstopp refser Devold’ [Top military reprimands Devold], Dagbladet, 4 Sept. 2003. 44. ‘Forsvarstopp refser Devold’ (n.43 above). 45. ‘Norske soldater: Godt å komme hjem’ [Norwegian soldiers: good to be home], NTB, 5 July 2004. 46. General Sverre Diesen, ‘Forsvarets utfordringer’ [Challenges for the armed forces], 13 Nov. 2006 (www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00085/Foredrag_13_nov_061_85816a.doc)

Homeland · Military threat · Multinational corporation · Norwegian · Peacekeeping · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Restructuring · Sociology · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Public Administration

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