Ethical Expertise and Moral Authority
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12568412 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Keith Dowding (0000-0001-6888-9369, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 31-46 |
| Publication date | 2023-04-18 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Politicas (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1576-4184 • E-ISSN: 1989-6115 |
| Publisher | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11158-023-09593-4 |
| OpenAlex | W4366267000 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 28 |
Whether or not there is such a thing as moral expertise, and, if so, what constitutes it, is much debated. Empirical expertise bestows epistemic authority over propositional content; that is not the case in moral domains, technical expertise notwithstanding. This article identifies three types of agencies with some authority over decisions in moral matters. It shows that the source of the authority wielded by such agencies, while varying across the three forms identified, is based on empirical and technical knowledge and does not derive solely from any moral expertise of its members. The article examines, and finds wanting, two recent arguments for giving others authority over moral content
Epistemology · Moral authority · Moral disengagement · Moral reasoning · Political science · Social cognitive theory of morality · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non‐Philosophers
Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology
In defense of moral testimony
A Defense of Moral Deference
Quality Attestation for Clinical Ethics Consultants
Making sense of humanity and other philosophical papers, 1982-1993
Unreliable Protection
Intuition Fail
| Citations per year | 1.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |