A Further Defence of the Right Not to Vote

Bibliographic Data

ID12568596
AuthorsBen Saunder (0000-0002-5147-6397, University of Southampton, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume24
Issue1
Pages93-108
Publication date2018-01-11
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueRes Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Politicas (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1576-4184 • E-ISSN: 1989-6115
PublisherSpringer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1007/s11158-017-9391-0
OpenAlexW2783551434
LanguageEN
Citations received7
References cited47

Opponents of compulsory voting often allege that it violates a ‘right not to vote’. This paper seeks to clarify and defend such a right against its critics (Lardy in Oxf J Leg Stud 24:303–321, 2004; Hill in Aust J Polit Sci 50:61–72, 2015a; in Crit Rev Int Soc Polit Philos 18:652–660, 2015b). First, I propose that this right must be understood as a Hohfeldian claim against being compelled to vote, rather than as a mere privilege to abstain. So construed, the right not to vote is compatible with a duty to vote, so arguments for a duty to vote do not refute the existence of such a right. The right against compulsion is most easily defended within a liberal framework, hence its critics often appeal instead to a republican conception of freedom. In the latter part of the paper, I argue that even these republican arguments are inconclusive. Even non-dominating interference still conditions freedom, which may require justification. Further, citizens can live up to republican ideals, so long as they are vigilant; they need not actually vote. Thus, republican arguments fail to refute a right not to vote

Appeal · Contingent vote · Duty · Group voting ticket · Law and economics · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Privilege (computing · Sociology · Spoilt vote · Voting · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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