Federalism and Its Discontents

Fiscal and Legislative Power-Sharing in Germany, 1948-1999

Bibliographic Data

ID12576507
AuthorsK Adelberger (corresponding author)
Year2001
Volume11
Issue2
Pages43-68
Publication date2001-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueRegional & Federal Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1359-7566 • E-ISSN: 1743-9434
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/714004687
OpenAlexW2077213884
LanguageEN
Citations received12

The division of fiscal and legislative responsibilities forms the backbone of every federal constitution.Germany has attracted attention as one of the clearest examples of "cooperative federalism" and, recently, as a locus of debates about more competitive routes to organizing federal systems.This article examines trends since 1948 that centralized legislative competencies and heightened the sharing of financial burdens.The unidirectional dynamic in these reforms -underscored by failed attempts at devolution in the 1980s and 1990s -is explained by focussing on politics in the Bundesrat, the second house in the German Parliament, in which state governors are seated."Federalism" policies position the rich states against the federal government; any majority to change the system must be built with poor states' votes.The poor states, likely losers of competition among jurisdictions, vote for financial solidarity and centralized policymaking but against devolution.The article predicts a continuation of the problematic status quo, and concludes by contrasting two evaluations of Germany's failure to achieve a more "competitive federalism

Decentralization · Federalism · fiscal federalism · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration

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